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Abstract 
 
This study conducts multiple approaches to identify earnings management within the Australian 
market. Companies with small positive earnings and positive earnings changes, referred to as 
benchmark beaters are assumed to be managing their earnings. Versions of the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model, Jones accrual quality model (1991, 1995) and earnings persistence 
measures are applied to identify whether companies with small positive earnings and small 
positive earnings changes manage their earnings. Evidence is identified to suggest that 
benchmark beaters manage their earnings to report a small positive Basic EPS result and this is 
supported by earnings persistence tests. However, when testing benchmark beaters based on 
reporting a small positive NPAT result, discretionary accruals are not significantly different for 
benchmark beaters compared to other firms. No evidence is identified to suggest that firms who 
report a small positive earnings change are managing earnings to acquire this benchmark. 
Earnings distributions are tested using NPAT and Basic EPS with no discontinuity identified at 
zero for small positive earnings and small positive earnings changes.  
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Chapter 1 Problem Identification 
Introduction 
Earnings management is an important accounting issue for market participants and academics. 
Prior research has identified the importance of earnings information within the financial 
statements, illustrating the reliance investors, creditors and market participants place on 
earnings to make investment decisions (Dechow, Hutton, Kim and Sloan, 2012). Opportunistic 
manipulation of earnings by firms reduces the quality of financial reporting and causes earnings 
reports to become more reflective of the discretion of management, as opposed to the 
underlying financial performance of the firm (Levitt, 1998).  
 
Earnings management literature has identified measures to capture the extent of management 
discretion in earnings reported by firms in order to assess accounting quality. One approach is to 
identify discretionary earnings, which are defined as the intentional manipulation of accruals to 
increase managers’ utility and maximize firm value (Ibrahim, 2009). Discretionary earnings 
have been previously assessed by researchers using a distribution of earnings approach. This 
approach assumes earnings management occurs around frequently evaluated earnings 
benchmarks where firms have strong incentives to manage earnings. In addition, accrual based 
models have been developed to examine the accruals accounting process to assess the level of 
discretionary earnings reported.  
 
This thesis employs a distribution of earnings test in conjunction with accrual based models to 
test whether Australian companies manage their earnings around recognised benchmarks. The 
analysis presented examines two earnings distribution benchmarks, which are the achievement 
of positive earnings and a positive change in earnings. Companies that fall within these 
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categories are referred to as benchmark beaters (Coulton, Taylor and Taylor, 2005). Prior 
research shows that these benchmarks are likely to attract earnings managers due to implicit and 
explicit incentives for firms to achieve them (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999). Firms 
attaining positive earnings and positive earnings change benchmarks have been found to report 
lower costs of debt and higher equity evaluations, even after controlling for the absolute 
magnitude of earnings changes (Jiang, 2008; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002). In addition, 
earnings are closely monitored by investors, directors, customers and suppliers, creating strong 
incentives for managers to manipulate reported earnings around earnings benchmarks 
(Degeorge et al. 1999). Specifically, this thesis examines whether benchmark beating firms 
manage their earnings compared to other firms to meet positive earnings and positive earnings 
change benchmarks. The analysis conducted tests whether the benchmark beating firms have 
significantly lower earnings quality than other firms. 
 
Several studies from the United States (U.S) have provided evidence of earnings management 
around benchmarks (Degeorge et al. 1999; Durtschi and Easton, 2009). Early research by 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Beatty and Petroni (2002) suggest earnings management by 
U.S firms identified by a discontinuity around zero. They find a larger than expected number of 
firms report small positive earnings and positive earnings changes, which suggests earnings 
management to achieve earnings benchmarks. Other studies within the U.S. also report a similar 
pattern of earnings distribution when deflating earnings by sales revenue and total assets 
(Durtschi and Easton, 2005; Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003; Burgstahler et al. 1997). 
Degeorge et al. (1999) highlight earnings management by U.S. firms based on three frequently 
evaluated benchmarks: small positive earnings, sustaining recent performance, and meeting 
analysts’ forecasts. 
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However, there has been some debate about the benchmark beating explanation. Later research 
questions the research design used by previous studies implementing distribution of earnings 
tests (Coulton et al. 2005; Durtschi et al. 2005). For example, Durtschi et al. (2005) provide 
evidence that the shape of the frequency distribution of earnings is impacted by the deflator 
used to scale earnings. They suggest that deflators such as price and market capitalisation 
accentuate the discontinuity at zero.  
 
Australian studies have also identified a discontinuity of earnings around zero for firms 
reporting small net profits and small positive earnings increases (Holland and Ramsay, 2003; 
Coulton et al. 2005). These discontinuities have been reported as evidence of Australian firms 
managing earnings to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. Coulton et al. (2005) evaluated the 
extent of earnings management by Australian firms from the perspective of a joint hypothesis. 
Specifically, they assessed earnings management using an earnings distribution approach in 
conjunction with earnings quality measures. Their study highlighted the controversial nature of 
the distribution patterns around zero and, for this reason, implemented accrual based models in 
conjunction with distribution earnings tests to provide a more robust characterisation of 
earnings management. They recognised that their results did not definitively answer the 
question as to whether Australian firms manage earnings around benchmarks including small 
positive earnings and small earnings changes. Their study indicated that benchmark beaters on 
average reported higher unexpected accruals using three versions of the Jones model (Jones, 
1995). However, higher unexpected accruals were also reported for small net loss firms. In 
addition, Coulton et al. (2005) established a discontinuity of earnings around zero when 
deflating by total assets, market value and sales revenue. However, they did not find a 
discontinuity at zero using earnings per share (EPS) due to a lack of sufficient data. 
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Contrasting evidence is provided by Coulton et al. (2005) in relation to the magnitude of 
earnings management by Australian firms. This mixed evidence could be due to the earnings 
management models used in their analysis, with versions of the modified Jones model unable to 
detect the extent or magnitude of the discretionary earnings management. As conclusive 
evidence was not provided by Coulton et al. (2005), it is reasonable to suggest that discretionary 
earnings management is taking place amongst benchmark beaters yet it is not being detected by 
the accrual based models employed in prior studies.  
 
Currently, earnings management research in Australia is still searching for more conclusive 
evidence to capture the degree of earnings management by Australian firm’s benchmark beating. 
Recently, Habib and Hossain (2008) tested for earnings management using analysts’ forecasts 
as a benchmark and again earnings management was not established for Australian firms. To 
evaluate the extent of earnings management Habib et al. (2008) measured unexpected accruals 
using versions of the modified Jones model. They did not find a significant difference between 
the mean and median of unexpected accruals for firms that just meet or beat analyst forecasts, 
against the just miss firms. 
 
The development of new accrual based models for determining earnings management provides 
further opportunity to test the relation between benchmark beaters and earnings management. 
To date, research has not been conducted to evaluate the extent of earnings management by 
Australian companies using versions of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality model 
within the context of benchmark beating. Therefore, this study uses the Dechow et al. (2002) 
model to measure the degree of earnings management conducted by Australian firms. Accruals 
quality is captured by the Dechow et al. (2002) model through its measurement of changes in 
working capital and how these changes are reflected in operating cash flows. The Dechow et al. 
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(2002) model is used because this model is considered to be more likely to directly capture 
accruals quality (Jones, Krishnan and Melendrez, 2008; Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 
2005).  
 
Prior research has used accrual quality measures to assess the magnitude of earnings 
management conducted by firms. Accrual quality measures including the Jones model and 
modified Jones model have been used extensively to measure earnings management (Jones, 
1991; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). Similarly, the Dechow et al. (2002) approach to 
measurement of accruals quality has been implemented widely in a number of empirical studies. 
The Dechow et al. (2002) model was argued by Francis et al. (2005) to be the most direct 
measure of accruals quality. This study implements versions of the Dechow et al. (2002) model 
to measure the degree of earnings management conducted by benchmark beaters. Versions of 
the Jones model and modified Jones model are also included in this analysis to allow for 
comparison with results derived from versions of the Dechow et al. (2002) model. 
 
The emphasis of this study is to identify discretionary accruals rather than accruals that occur 
systematically due to innate industry and firm characteristics. Dechow et al. (2002) argue that, 
even without intentional earnings management, accruals quality is systematically impacted by 
firm and industry characteristics. The Dechow et al. (2002) model measures accruals quality, 
without distinguishing between discrepancies in earnings and cash flows that are associated 
with innate firm and industry characteristics or discretionary earnings manipulation. To better 
characterise the degree of earnings management by Australian firms, accruals quality is 
decomposed into innate and discretionary components using the approach outlined by Francis et 
al. (2005). The innate component of accruals quality is related to economic fundamentals of the 
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firm, as opposed to the discretionary component which is a consequence of manipulation of 
earnings by management (Francis et al. 2005). 
 
The results of the analysis presented in this thesis provide evidence that benchmark beaters 
manage their earnings to achieve a small positive Basic Earnings per Share (EPS) result. 
Additional analysis using earnings persistence tests supported the finding that benchmark 
beaters manage their earnings to report a small positive Basic EPS. No evidence was found to 
suggest that benchmark beaters manage their earnings to report a small positive Net Profit after 
Tax (NPAT). Nor was evidence found to show benchmark beaters are managing their earnings 
to report a small positive earnings change. 
Motivation 
The results of earnings management studies have received wide interest, with reviews 
completed by Schipper (1989), Healy and Wahlen (1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000) and 
Dechow, Ge and Schrand, (2010). Analysts, investors and executives consider earnings to be the 
most important information provided in the financial report of publicly listed firms. Incremental 
information on the management of earnings information is important to financial statement 
users because of the importance of earnings to inform investment decisions (Degeorge et al. 
1999). 
 
Prior studies assume that benchmark beaters are managing earnings opportunistically and 
measure a consequence based on this assumption (Dechow et al. 2010). Conclusive evidence 
has not been established within an Australian context to confirm that benchmark beaters manage 
earnings (Coulton et al. 2005; Habib et al. 2008). This research is motivated by the need for 
more evidence to verify that benchmark beaters do manage their earnings to achieve positive 
earnings and earnings change benchmarks. If discretionary earnings can be more 
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comprehensively identified within the Australian literature, this will allow studies to more 
accurately define the motivation for, and consequences of, earnings management. 
 
Earnings management research identifies many payoffs for firm managers who match or surpass 
benchmarks including positive earnings and positive earnings changes. Barth, Elliott and Finn 
(1999) establish that firms with patterns of increasing earnings have higher price to earnings 
ratios after controlling for growth and risk. In addition, firms who deviated from positive 
earnings patterns experienced significant negative abnormal stock returns for that particular year 
(De Angelo, De Angelo and Skinner, 1996). Frequently, manager’s compensation benefits are 
implicitly and explicitly dependant on the earnings of the firm (Healy, 1985). With such strong 
consequences for not meeting important benchmarks and the attachment of compensation 
benefits to earnings, anecdotally it seems very likely that earnings management occurs around 
significant benchmarks (Holland et al. 2003). However, Australian literature has yet to provide 
consistent evidence of the relation between benchmark beaters and earnings management. 
 
A major objective of financial reporting standards is to provide financial statement users with 
high quality financial reporting. High quality reporting allows financial statement users to 
efficiently assess the economic fundamentals of a firm and provides efficient resource allocation 
within the market (Levitt, 1998). This study is motivated by the ability to more easily identify 
earnings management and to ensure that firms are reporting financial information that is 
reflective of the underlying performance of the firm. Ideally, financial reporting allows the best 
performing companies to clearly differentiate themselves from poor quality firms in the market 
(Healy et al. 1999). While recognising the difficulty of detecting discretionary accruals reported 
by firms, multiple studies have used measures of earnings management to assess accounting 
quality (Thomas and Zhang, 2000; Othman and Zeghal, 2006; Chang and Sun, 2009). 
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Financial reports are intended to provide credible and private information regarding the 
performance of the firm. This requires an element of reporting flexibility by management to 
most efficiently convey this information (Healy et al. 1999). Conversely, it is this reporting 
flexibility which provides managers with the ability to manage earnings opportunistically. This 
trade off in financial reporting efficiency requires standard setters to make a judgement on the 
level of flexibility afforded to management in financial reporting. Incremental information on 
the extent and frequency of earnings management is likely to help standard setters resolve this 
general question (Healy et al. 1999). In addition, further information regarding the extent of 
earnings management around key earnings benchmarks could provide greater scrutiny and 
evaluation of benchmark beaters, curbing the opportunity for firms to manage earnings. 
Identifying models that enhance researchers’ ability to detect discretionary accruals and 
earnings management is essential to the development and assessment of reporting standards. 
This thesis provides incremental information to regulators, researchers and market participants 
regarding the extent of earnings management conducted by Australian firms.  
 
Contribution 
Evaluation of the distribution of earnings around benchmarks including positive earnings and 
earnings changes has yielded differing results within the earnings management literature. 
Coulton et al. (2005) advise caution when observing a discontinuity of earnings around zero, 
remarking that these discontinuities may not reflect evidence of earnings management. 
Alternatively, Holland et al. (2003) report earnings management by Australian firms based on a 
discontinuity of earnings established by Australian firms reporting positive profits and 
sustaining previous year’s profit performance. Importantly, EPS and NPAT have been discussed 
as earnings metrics which can be used to establish earnings management (Durtschi et al. 2009). 
This study provides an updated view of earnings distributions for 2007 based on positive 
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earnings and earnings changes. While this thesis recognises that discontinuities of earnings 
around benchmarks are not conclusive evidence of earnings management, it provides new data 
that is relevant to assessing the issue. 
 
This study extends prior research of earnings management by evaluating versions of the 
Dechow et al. (2002) accrual quality measures on Australian firms. The ability of the Dechow et 
al. (2002) model to detect earnings management was demonstrated recently by Jones et al. 
(2008). This study compared the ability of ten accruals quality models to detect extreme cases 
of earnings management in circumstances of fraudulent earnings overstatement and non-
fraudulent restatements of earnings. Jones et al. (2008) established that of the models tested 
only the Dechow et al. (2002) model and the McNichols (2002) version of the Dechow et al. 
(2002) model detected the earnings manipulation. Based on these findings it seems likely that 
applying versions of the Dechow et al. (2002) model to Australian data can provide further 
insights in to earnings management.  
 
Data requirements for the Dechow et al. (2002) model include operating cash flows for the prior, 
current and subsequent periods to operationalize the Dechow et al. (2002) model. Australian 
researchers are in a unique position to evaluate the Dechow et al. model (2002) as the operating 
cash flows can be obtained directly from cash flow statements through the direct cash flow 
method. The direct cash flow reporting method was introduced to Australia in 1992 and was 
mandated by Australian accounting standard AASB 127 Statement of Cash Flows until early 
2009.  
 
In contrast, other jurisdictions such as the U.S. allow companies the option of reporting the 
direct or indirect cash flow method. If U.S companies report the indirect cash flow method 
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researchers are required to estimate the operating cash flows through calculations from the 
balance sheet to the income statement. Numerous studies have revealed that a variety of issues 
can affect the accuracy of estimating operating cash flow components from the indirect 
disclosure method. This is an important point because Australian researchers can rely more 
confidently on the integrity of their data without the concern of estimating operating cash flows.  
 
Previous research has demonstrated that calculations from the balance sheet to the income 
statement can often yield figures that do not reconcile with the relevant operating cash flow 
account (Krishnan and Largay, 2000; Bahnson, Miller and Budge, 1996). Importantly, Hribar 
and Collins (2001) found measurement errors in accrual estimates calculated by studies using 
the balance sheet approach. These studies highlight the integrity and validity of data that is 
available to Australian researchers. Australian studies within the earnings management literature 
have not previously evaluated earnings management based on direct cash flows reported by 
Australian firms. This study is evaluating earnings management during 2007 and, therefore, 
takes advantage of the direct cash flows reported by Australian firms. 
 
This chapter has described the research addressed in this thesis and summarised the contribution 
to existing literature. In chapter two, relevant literature is reviewed to identify theory and to 
develop hypotheses. Chapter three describes the research method to test the hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapter. Chapter Four presents analysis and results. The findings of 
the research are summarised and the limitations and implications of the study are discussed in 
chapter five. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Literature Review 
Three key areas of earnings management literature are reviewed in this chapter. Firstly, prior 
studies related to the distribution of earnings around frequently evaluated benchmarks are 
reviewed. Secondly, the development of accrual based earnings management models are 
reviewed within the earnings management literature. Thirdly, studies that have addressed the 
ability of accrual based models to detect earnings management are discussed. The review of 
literature in these three areas then leads to the development of the hypotheses section.  
 
Distribution of Earnings 
This section reviews the literature related to distributions of earnings. Initially the review 
focuses on international studies, and this is followed by a review of earnings distribution studies 
in the Australian market. Earnings distribution studies evaluate the frequency of firms reporting 
earnings around zero to assess whether a discontinuity exists. A discontinuity is identified when 
earnings results do not follow a relatively normal distribution around zero. Frequently, the 
distribution of earnings and earnings changes are evaluated for a discontinuity to establish 
whether firms are managing their earnings.  
 
Using cross-sectional distributions of U.S earnings data, Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler et al. 
(1997) observe a discontinuity of earnings around zero. The earnings measures used included 
net income deflated by opening period market capitalisation, and change in net income deflated 
by opening period market capitalisation. Their findings demonstrate a concentration of firms 
reporting small positive earnings and earnings increases, compared to a fewer than expected 
number of firms reporting small losses and small earnings decreases. Based on an assumption of 
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a normal distribution, discontinuities around zero are suggested to be evidence of firms 
managing their earnings (Burgstahler et al. 1997). 
 
Degeorge et al. (1999) evaluated the earnings management of firms in the context of three 
thresholds that motivate earnings management. The thresholds are: firms reporting positive 
profits, for example one penny per share; firms reporting profits above a prior comparable 
period (change in EPS); and, firms exceeding analysts’ projections. Degeorge et al. (1999) 
analyse the density function for each threshold over the 1974-96 period. Importantly, they do 
not normalize their EPS figure because deflation of EPS can cause a spurious build up in the 
density at zero. They establish that a discontinuity exists around zero for each of the three 
thresholds. Furthermore, a threshold hierarchy is established based on the relative importance of 
achieving the threshold for each firm. Reporting a positive EPS is identified as the most 
important threshold, followed by positive earnings changes and, lastly, reporting profits 
exceeding analyst’s forecasts.  
 
Later research by Dechow et al. (2003) suggests caution when interpreting the ratio of small 
profit firms to small loss firms as evidence of earnings management. They investigate whether 
the discontinuity, or ‘kink’ as they refer to it, in earnings distribution identified by Hayn (1995) 
and Burgstahler et al. (1997) is due to an increase in discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) 
provide alternative reasons for the discontinuity and they suggest some factors which may 
impact the magnitude of the discontinuity. Their tests establish that selection bias and scaling 
issues are likely factors that play a role in the size of the earnings kink observed around zero. 
They also suggest that investors apply different valuation methods to loss firms as opposed to 
profit firms and this is likely to accentuate the kink in earnings. 
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Additional evidence is provided by Durtschi et al. (2009) about factors which are likely to 
accentuate the discontinuity at zero. Their study is motivated by the observation that the 
distributions of net income, basic EPS and diluted EPS do not show a discontinuity at zero. 
While a discontinuity at zero is observed for earnings deflated by beginning-of-year market 
capitalisation, beginning-of-year total assets and sales revenue. Durtschi et al. (2009) test the 
influence deflators have on a distribution of earnings test. They show that deflating net income 
(numerator) by the beginning of year market capitalisation (denominator) distorts the 
distribution measure in predictable ways based on the magnitude and sign of net income. For 
example, beginning of year market price captures the future steam of expected earnings and this 
relationship will impact on the distribution of earnings reported by net income deflated by 
beginning of year market capitalisation (Durtschi et al. 2009). Their salient point is that no 
deflator should be used if it distorts the underlying distribution at zero. 
 
Sample selection criteria is an additional factor highlighted by Durtschi et al. (2009), which can 
have the potential to contribute to a pervasive or biased discontinuity at zero. Specifically, they 
identify the results of analysis by Jacob and Jorgensen (2007) as erroneously concluding a 
discontinuity at zero because of severe sample selection bias. They state that sample selection 
bias occurs, ‘if a sample selection criterion leads to the deletion of more observations of small 
losses than observations of small profits, the shape of the earnings distribution in the vicinity of 
zero cannot be used as evidence of earnings management’ (Durtschi et al. 2009; pg 1279). 
 
An alternative interpretation for the discontinuity in earnings is provided by Beaver, McNichols 
and Nelson (2007). They demonstrate how the asymmetric effects of income tax and special 
items for profit and loss firms contribute to the discontinuity of earnings at zero (Beaver et al. 
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2007). Income taxes induce profit observations towards zero and negative special items have a 
tendency to pull loss observations away from zero, creating the discontinuity observed at zero. 
 
While a number of studies have provided explanations for the discontinuity in the earnings 
distribution, researchers have not excluded the proposition that earnings management is a 
contributing factor. Durtschi et al. (2009), reason that distributions of net income and earnings 
per share are earnings metrics which can be used to show evidence of earnings management. 
The findings of Durtschi et al. (2009) demonstrate that distribution of earnings metrics can be 
implemented to establish credible evidence of earnings management. Furthermore, there are 
advantages to using earnings distributions to detect earnings management because they do not 
rely on proxy models to decompose earnings in to discretionary and non-discretionary 
components (Plummer and Mest, 2000).  
 
Kerstein and Rei (2007) examine the change in cumulative earnings distribution from the 
beginning fiscal quarter to the end of the firm’s fourth fiscal quarter. They test whether firms 
moved abnormally during the fourth quarter earnings distribution to report a small positive 
earnings result. Kerstein et al. (2007) show that a higher proportion of firms report small profits 
during the fourth fiscal quarter compared to firms reporting positive profits in the first fiscal 
quarter. They argue that this is an indication of earnings management and that firms are likely to 
manage their earnings upwards. Their findings are based on a control group which is identified 
as firms close to the zero profit line at the end of the third fiscal quarter. It is this control group 
which reports a higher than expected frequency of positive profits. 
 
Other studies implementing the distributions of earnings approach have attempted to identify 
which income-statement items are used to manage earnings. Plummer et al. (2000) suggest 
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firms manipulate earnings upwards by managing sales upwards and by managing operating 
expenses downwards. Interestingly, Jacob et al. (2007) aggregate different quarterly earnings 
over annual periods and compare these annual periods to the fiscal year calculated for each firm. 
They construct a benchmark for expected frequency in partitions of histograms of fiscal year 
earnings, based on the distribution of annual earnings in the other three annual periods. Using a 
distribution of earnings approach, they maintain that firms manage earnings to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses, reasoning that their results confirm and generally validate the 
discontinuities of earnings reported by Burgstahler et al. (1997). 
 
Another earnings benchmark tested by Bennett and Bradbury (2007) was the dividend cover 
threshold. The use of this earnings threshold was based on the view that firms are motivated to 
manage earnings to avoid a decrease in the level of dividend paid for the prior year. Using a 
distribution of earnings technique, asymmetry was found in the distribution of earnings around 
the dividend cover threshold. Bennett et al. (2007) suggest that the dividend cover threshold is 
important for international research and studies examining earnings benchmarks. They also 
indicate that the dividend cover threshold is more likely to be relevant in jurisdictions where the 
dividend payout is relatively high and where the legal system requires dividends to be paid out 
of profits. 
 
Bennett and Bradbury (2010) examine whether New Zealand firms are manipulating earnings 
around earnings benchmarks and, if so, how the earnings management occurs. They use time-
series and cross-sectional series ratio analysis to establish whether New Zealand firms manage 
their net profit before tax. Similar to previous Australian studies they do not identify evidence 
of earnings management through accruals manipulation. However, their results do suggest that 
firms just above the dividend cover threshold engage in real economic actions as opposed to 
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accounting discretion to achieve earnings benchmarks (Bennett et al. 2010; Bruns and Merchant, 
1990).  
 
Distributions of Earnings – Australian Studies 
Prior Australian studies have also demonstrated a discontinuity of earnings around zero in the 
context of small positive earnings and small positive earnings changes. Holland et al. (2003) 
implement a research design using deflators for earnings including beginning of year book value 
of total assets and beginning of year market value of common equity. They find evidence 
establishing a discontinuity of earnings at zero for positive earnings and positive earnings 
changes. They find these results are strongest for large firms. Results show that a discontinuity 
at zero does not exist for small companies when testing positive earnings and small positive 
earnings changes.  
 
Australian firms have also been evaluated to assess the level of earnings management within the 
context of meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts (Habib et al. 2008). Evidence for Australian 
firms has failed to establish a significant difference between the mean and median for 
unexpected accruals for just meet firms or beat firms, as opposed to just miss firms (Habib et al. 
2008). Habib et al. (2008) used the modified Jones model as the basis for assessing unexpected 
accruals, with results showing an absence of discernible earnings management. No significant 
difference was found between the earnings quality of benchmark beating firms and other firms. 
Similarly, Coulton et al. (2005) were unable to identify earnings management by Australian 
firms based on positive earnings and positive earnings change benchmarks. Their study tests a 
joint hypothesis where they examined whether a discontinuity in earnings was evidence of 
earnings management. In conjunction with the distribution of earnings tests they also assessed 
whether benchmark beaters have higher unexpected accruals compared to just miss firms and 
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other firms. The evidence was contradictory, with benchmark beaters reporting higher 
unexpected accruals compared to other firms, although just miss firms also reported a higher 
level of unexpected accruals. Unexpected accruals were tested using three models including the 
original modified Jones model (1995), the modified Jones model augmented with lagged total 
accruals, and the modified Jones model with the inclusion of lagged total accruals and growth 
for the following period. Earnings management was not detected for the three accrual based 
models. 
 
Additionally, Coulton et al. (2005) evaluate earnings distributions by deflating operating 
income and changes in operating income by total assets, market value and sales revenue. 
Importantly, they included a distribution analysis of EPS, although as the authors recognise they 
did not have sufficient data for any meaningful analysis. Coulton et al. (2005) also evaluated 
raw earnings with no discontinuity identified at zero for positive earnings and positive earnings 
changes. The results demonstrated by Coulton et al. (2005) show that discontinuities at zero 
were found for positive earnings and positive earnings changes when earnings metrics were 
deflated or normalised. Alternatively, no discontinuities at zero were identified using raw 
earnings and EPS, earnings metrics without deflation. 
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Literature Review – Accrual Based Models 
Healy (1985) defined accounting earnings as having three components including cash flows 
from operations, non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. Total accruals were 
calculated as the difference between reported earnings and operating cash flows. Total accruals 
for the immediate prior period were used as the proxy for expected accruals during the test 
period. This proxy for expected accruals was then evaluated against the total accruals for the 
event period, with any discrepancy assumed to be the discretionary component of total accruals. 
 
DeAngelo (1986) analysed the accounting decisions made by sixty-four New York and 
American Stock Exchange firms. The consideration in this study was the vested interest 
managers had in manipulating their earnings downward to reduce the cost of buying back shares. 
Total accruals for the immediate prior period were used as a benchmark for identifying current 
accruals excluding any income manipulation to assess potential earnings management 
(DeAngelo, 1986). The average value of the abnormal accrual was then calculated based on 
discrepancies between total accruals for the prior period and total accruals for the current period. 
If this value was significantly negative in periods prior to a buyout, this was interpreted as 
systematic earnings understatement. This accrual quality model developed by DeAngelo (1986) 
assumed non-discretionary accruals remained constant from one period to the next. Early 
accrual models such as DeAngelo (1986) and Healy (1985) did not adequately account for the 
changes in conditions that can affect a firms non-discretionary accrual components from period 
to period. These changes can adversely impact the quality of the discretionary accrual 
component measured.  
 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) measured the level of earnings management by firms by 
assessment of a single accrual, the provision for doubtful debts. Their study was designed to 
19 
 
overcome the problems with variation in non-discretionary earnings by isolating a discretionary 
accrual proxy. Their approach differed from alternative measures in that they used generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to develop a discretionary accrual proxy. This 
discretionary accrual proxy was calculated from a balance sheet perspective, using the aged 
receivables method to estimate the expected level of provision for doubtful debts. Specifically, 
they assumed that firms adhere strictly to GAAP and that the expected level of provision for 
doubtful debts is projected as the summation of the opening balance for the allowance, current 
period write offs and managements expectation of future write-offs (McNichols et al. 1988). 
 
A subsequent study by Jones (1991) provided a key model for determining expected accruals 
and unexpected or abnormal accruals. The Jones (1991) model assesses aggregate accruals by 
calculating the expected prediction error of total accruals from prior periods. Unlike previous 
accrual based models the Jones model calculates the expected total accruals benchmark using 
the longest times series available for each firm. The prediction error calculated by the Jones 
model (1991) during the test period is compared to the prediction error for the event period, 
with significant differences identified as unexpected accruals. Jones (1991) recognised that 
economic circumstances could impact a firm’s non-discretionary accruals from period to period 
and accounted for this in her aggregate accruals model. Gross property, plant and equipment 
(PPE) and changes in revenue were included in the expected accrual regression to control for 
changes in non-discretionary components to capture firms changing economic circumstances 
(Jones, 1991). These additional variables further refined the model previously completed by 
DeAngelo (1986), who had previously assumed non-discretionary accruals were consistent from 
one period to the next. 
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The industry model was introduced in 1991 by Dechow and Sloan to examine the earnings 
management behaviour of firms with significant research and design expenditures. The industry 
model is similar to the Jones model, but it relaxes the assumption that non-discretionary 
accruals are constant over time. It models expected accruals based on an industry average where 
variations in non-discretionary accruals are assumed to be consistent across all firms in the 
industry (Dechow et al. 1991). The total expected accruals for each firm in an industry is 
calculated based on the median total accruals for that industry. This model provides for 
variation in non-discretionary accruals that are attributed to changes that are common across all 
firms in the same industry, but does not directly examine firm specific changes in non-
discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1991). 
 
The Jones model had implied that discretion over revenues during the estimation period and the 
period being assessed did not occur (Dechow et al. 1995). The modified Jones model (1995) 
incorporated the change in receivables and the change in revenues in the event period. The 
modified Jones model assumes that any changes in credit sales during the event period are the 
result of earnings management. While the modified Jones model improved power to capture 
manipulation of accruals, all the models tested demonstrated low power to recognise earnings 
management at economically plausible levels (1-5 per cent of total assets) (Dechow et al. 1995). 
 
Further evidence on the time-series versions of the standard Jones and modified Jones models 
suggested both models estimated discretionary accruals with a considerable degree of 
imprecision (Dechow et al. 1995; Guay and Kothari and Watts, 1996; Kang and 
Shivaramakrishnan, 1995). Peasnell and Pope and Young (2000) established that the Jones 
model and modified Jones models provided more powerful indicators of earnings management 
using a cross sectional approach. Their study evaluated three accrual based models with results 
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indicating that the choice of accrual model should depend on the predicted form of earnings 
management, that is revenue based or expense based manipulation (Peasnell et al. 2000). Whilst 
the nature or intent behind earnings management is not always apparent, this finding by Peasnell 
et al. (2000) implies that one particular accrual based model is unlikely to adequately capture all 
forms of earnings management.  
 
Dechow et al. (2002) designed another method for measuring the quality of working capital 
accruals and earnings. They developed a model to capture the extent to which working capital 
accruals map in to cash flows. The model measure’s accrual estimation error as the ‘residuals 
from firm-specific regressions of changes in working capital on last year, present, and one-year 
ahead cash flows from operation’ (Dechow et al. 2002; pg 36). The standard deviation of the 
regression residuals is used to measure accrual quality, with a higher standard deviation 
indicating a lower accruals quality. Unlike previous earnings management studies, they did not 
attempt to distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary earnings. In addition, they 
assessed firm and industry characteristics that systematically reduced accruals quality and 
contributed to variation in non-discretionary accruals. Firm specific factors which demonstrated 
the strongest propensity to adversely impact accruals quality included length of operating cycle, 
standard deviation of sales, standard deviation of accruals, magnitude of accruals and amount of 
negative earnings (Dechow et al. 2002).  
 
In her review of the Dechow et al. (2002) paper, McNichols (2002) evaluated the Jones (1991) 
model and the Dechow et al. (2002) model with the objective of creating a link between the two 
approaches to strengthen their ability to capture discretionary accruals. The set of estimation 
results for the Jones model was found to have some predictive power although this was 
substantially less than the Dechow et al. (2002) model. McNichols (2002) suggested an 
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extension to the Dechow et al. (2002) model based on evidence that a change in sales was a 
significantly correlated variable with cash flow from operations. McNichols (2002) suggested 
including a measure of property, plant and equipment and changes in sales in the Dechow et al. 
(2002) model, indicating that these variables improved the performance of the model. 
 
Francis et al. (2005) studied the impact of accruals quality on the cost of debt and equity, 
analysing the pricing of accruals quality based on McNichols’ version of the Dechow et al. 
model (2002). They implemented the Dechow et al. (2002) model using an industry cross 
section, highlighting the Dechow et al. (2002) model as the most direct measure for assessing 
accruals quality. They augment their initial analysis with the intent of distinguishing between 
unexpected accruals that are driven by economic fundamentals (innate accruals) and unexpected 
accruals influenced by management discretion (discretionary accruals). Two separate 
regressions are conducted by Francis et al. (2005) to identify a more reliable and cleaner 
measure for discretionary accruals.  
 
Firstly, a regression is completed based on the McNichols version of the Dechow et al. (2002) 
model to measure the accruals quality of each firm. The residual from the initial regression is 
used as the dependent variable for the second regression. The second regression is then 
conducted against control variables which have been previously shown to impact the innate 
accruals quality of the firm. These additional control variables were originally recognised by 
Dechow et al. (2002) and they include firm size, standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations, standard deviation of sales revenue, length of operating cycle and frequency of 
negative earnings (Francis et al. 2005). The regression residual identified by the second 
regression conducted is used as a measure for the firm’s discretionary accruals.  
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The Dechow et al. (2002) approach to measurement of accruals quality has been implemented 
widely in a number of empirical studies. These studies have used the measure to capture the 
association between capital markets and the quality of reported earnings (Francis et al., 2005; 
Aboody, Hughes and Liu, 2005; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Chen, Shevlin and Tong, 2007). 
Versions of the Dechow et al. (2002) model have also been applied in the context of accruals 
quality and corporate governance settings (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and Lafond, 2006; 
Doyle, Ge & McVay, 2007). In the majority of these studies, the variation of the original 
Dechow et al. (2002) model developed by McNichols (2002) is used to determine accruals 
quality. 
 
Another recent study has attempted to increase the detection of earnings management by 
recognising that any accrual based earnings management must be reversed in another period 
(Dechow et al. 2012). Specifically, the variation in discretionary accruals doubles if the 
researcher can correctly identify the periods in which earnings management commences and 
subsequently reverses. This increase in variation of discretionary accruals makes it more likely 
to identify earnings management (Dechow et al. 2012). Tests for this model have demonstrated 
an increase in power and specification compared to current accrual based models. However, the 
major concern with the Dechow et al. (2012) approach is the requirement that the model 
requires ‘priors concerning the period (s) in which the hypothesised earnings management is 
expected to reverse’ (Dechow et al. 2012; pg 276).  
 
This section of the literature review has outlined the development of accrual based models. An 
important issue in relation to accurately measuring earnings management is the relative capacity 
of each accrual based model to detect earnings management, which is examined in the next 
section. 
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Detecting Earnings Management (Accrual Models) 
This section discusses earnings management papers which have reviewed accrual based models 
in terms of their ability to detect earnings management. There is mixed evidence within the 
literature regarding the competence of accrual based models to identify discretionary earnings. 
Prior research has established that certain accrual based models are better specified or 
demonstrate increased power depending on the form of earnings management conducted 
(Peasnell et al. 2000).  
 
Alternative accrual-based models were assessed by Dechow et al. (1995) to measure their 
ability to capture discretionary earnings. The performance of each accrual model was tested to 
assess the frequency with which each accrual model generates type 1 and type 2 errors (Dechow 
et al. 1995). Type 1 errors occur when earnings management is not being conducted however 
the model identifies earnings management. Type 2 errors occur when earnings management is 
being conducted and the model does not capture the earnings management. The accrual models 
including Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones model (1991), Industry model (1991) and the 
modified Jones model were all found to be well specified. However, the power of each accrual 
model to capture economically plausible levels of earnings management was found to be low. 
Significantly, a modified Jones model applied by Dechow et al. (1995) demonstrated the 
strongest power to capture discretionary accruals compared to models including Healy (1985), 
DeAngelo (1986), Jones model (1991) and the Industry model. 
 
Prior to the Dechow et al. model (2002), other studies advocated the Jones and modified Jones 
models as having the potential to reliably estimate discretionary accruals (Guay et al. 1996). 
However, Guay et al. (1996) also refers to the imprecision of all the accrual based models tested 
within a market based context, including the Jones and modified Jones model. The tests 
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completed by Guay et al. (1996) illustrate the importance of evaluating discretionary accruals 
using a joint hypothesis. Specifically, they evaluated the predicted relations between earnings 
components (discretionary and non-discretionary accruals) and the predicted stock returns to 
identify evidence of discretionary accruals. Through analysis of earnings components using a 
joint hypothesis, researchers can provide a more robust result because the output of each accrual 
model is evaluated in the context of additional information. 
 
Given that discretionary accruals cannot be directly observed, some researchers have applied 
simulation methods to measure the power and specification of accrual based models (Peasnell et 
al. 2000). Three models were tested by Peasnell et al. (2000) including the Jones, modified 
Jones and Margin model. The margin model is similar to the Jones and modified Jones model 
excluding the change in revenue term. The margin models primary difference is the separation 
of the revenue term in to two components, substituting cash receipts in the contemporary period 
for revenues in the current period. The three models tested by Peasnell et al. (2000) 
demonstrated low power for economically plausible levels of earnings management. 
Importantly, evidence was established showing the improved performance of the models 
through tests applying an industry specification. In addition, models performed better in certain 
circumstances with Peasnell et al. (2000) recommending certain models be applied based on the 
predicted form of earnings management. For example, the weakness of the Jones (1991) model 
is its inability to capture sales based manipulation (Peasnell et al. 2000). 
 
Six different accrual prediction models were evaluated by Thomas et al. (2000) to determine the 
accuracy of models to predict total accruals and current accruals. The models tested included 
DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1995), Components model, modified Jones model (1995), Industry 
model (1991) and the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan model. Their paper focused on forecasting 
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accruals as opposed to detecting earnings management. They found the explanatory power of 
the models was high in-sample but this was not the case for out-of-sample testing, with R-
square values dropping significantly. The R-square was calculated based on the ability of each 
model to forecast accruals accurately. Only two of the six models tested outperformed a naïve 
total accruals and current accruals test, with the Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995) model 
demonstrating slightly improved performance for total accruals, and the Jones (1991) model 
outperforming the naïve current accruals test. Overall, their conclusion was that the existing 
models used in the literature to date are not very accurate at an absolute level. 
 
More recent studies have assessed the performance of these models to measure the extent to 
which managers opportunistically influence earnings. For example, Marquardt and Wiedman 
(2004) evaluated the use of specific accruals in three earnings management settings: equity 
offerings, management buyouts and firms avoiding earnings decreases. Their studies suggest 
that specific accrual accounts are not all used simultaneously to manage earnings and specific 
accrual accounts are used to manage earnings in particular circumstances. Using a performance 
matched approach based on industry, past performance and firm size, they establish that 
unexpected accruals are managed upwards prior to an equity offering and when firms are 
attempting to avoid negative earnings realisations. They also observed firms managing earnings 
downwards prior to management buyouts (Marquardt et al. 2004).  
 
Additional studies were carried out by Jones et al. (2008) to assess the ability of prevalent 
discretionary models to capture extreme cases of earnings management. The McNichols 
versions of the Dechow et al. (2002) method is shown to have the highest association with fraud, 
followed by the Dechow et al. (2002) measure. These findings are significant with the 
McNichols version of the Dechow et al. (2002) model and the Dechow et al. (2002) model 
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demonstrating 42.17 per cent and 34.98 per cent association with fraud respectively (Jones et al. 
2008). This is in contrast to the explanatory power of total accruals with a 2.58 per cent 
association with fraud. Other frequently used accrual models tested included the Jones model 
(1991), Beneish model, modified Jones model (1995) and versions of the Jones model using 
additional independent variables including book-to-market ratio, cash flows and return on assets. 
The Jones et al. (2008) study evaluated 10 discretionary accrual models with cross sectional 
data used due to sample size restrictions.  
 
A comprehensive review of the earnings management literature is completed by Dechow et al. 
(2010). They refer to the Dechow et al. (2002) model demonstrating higher predictability than 
the Jones and modified Jones models. This comparison is made based on regressions completed 
from the original Dechow et al. (2002) paper, where the Dechow et al (2002) model has an R-
square of 47 per cent at the firm level, 34 per cent at the industry level and 29 per cent at a 
pooled level. They also note that the Dechow et al. (2002) model is unsigned and this can 
reduce the power of tests. Additionally, they discuss the limited nature of the Dechow et al. 
(2002) model to identify distortions created by long term accruals.  
 
In a discussion paper reviewing the research completed by Dechow et al. (2010), Defond (2010) 
refers to the relative acceptance of the Dechow et al. (2002) model for measuring accruals 
quality. The variation applied to the Dechow et al. (2002) model by Francis et al. (2005) is 
identified as among the most current and widely accepted accrual based models in the existing 
research literature.  
 
This section of the literature review has reviewed accrual based models in terms of their ability 
to detect earnings management. Versions of the Dechow et al. (2002) model have been 
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identified as measures which can provide incremental information in relation to the magnitude 
of earnings management conducted by benchmark beating Australian firms. The following 
section outlines the hypothesis which will be tested in this study. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
This thesis adds to the existing studies that have tested whether benchmark beaters, exhibit 
earnings management consistent with prior Australian studies. Two benchmarks will be 
assessed, which are positive earnings and positive earnings changes.  
 
Prior evidence of Australian firms managing their earnings to report positive earnings and 
positive earnings changes have been identified by Holland et al. (2003) and Coulton et al. 
(2005). However, the deflators used by Holland et al. (2003) including beginning of year book 
value of total assets and beginning of year market value of common equity have been identified 
as deflators which are likely to accentuate the discontinuity at zero (Durtschi et al. 2009). 
Distributions of earnings tests were also completed by Coulton et al. (2005) and similarly the 
deflators used in their study are likely to have accentuated the discontinuity at zero (Durtschi et 
al. 2009). Coulton et al. (2005) measured distributions of earnings using operating income 
deflated by total assets, market value and sales revenue. Recall that EPS and net income without 
deflation have been recognised by Durtschi et al. (2009) as earnings metrics which can provide 
incremental information using a distribution of earnings approach. Revised earnings measures 
including Basic EPS and NPAT without deflation will be used in distributions of earnings tests 
to evaluate whether Australian firms manage their earnings to acquire positive earnings and 
positive earnings change benchmarks.  
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In addition to measuring discretionary accruals using a distribution of earnings approach, 
Coulton et al. (2005) measured discretionary accruals of benchmark beaters using accrual based 
models. Specifically, Coulton et al. (2005) were unable to identify higher discretionary accruals 
for benchmark beaters (positive earnings and positive earnings changes) as opposed to just miss 
firms using three versions of the modified Jones model. Similarly, Habib et al. (2008) used 
three versions of the modified Jones model to assess whether benchmark beating firms manage 
their earnings to beat analysts’ forecasts. Earnings management was not identified by Habib et 
al. (2008) based on the ASX listed companies evaluated. These Australian studies were not able 
to clearly identify earnings management around positive earnings and positive earnings change 
benchmarks. 
 
Francis et al. (2005) identify the McNichols version of the Dechow et al. (2002) model as the 
most direct measure for capturing discretionary accruals. They augment this model with five 
factors which have been shown to impact accruals quality based on the fundament factors of the 
firm. These five factors include firm size, standard deviation of cash flow from operations, 
standard deviation of sales revenue, length of operating cycle and frequency of negative 
earnings (Francis et al. 2005). This study identifies the Francis et al. (2005) version of the 
McNichols version of the Dechow et al. (2002) model as the most direct measure of 
discretionary accruals. The McNichols version of the Dechow et al. (2002) model and the 
original Dechow et al. (2002) model also demonstrate the strongest capability to recognise 
extreme cases of earnings management in a study where ten different accrual based models 
were tested (Jones et al. 2008).  
 
Given the ability of the Dechow et al. model (2002) to recognise earnings management this 
study implements versions of the Dechow et al. (2002) model to capture the degree of 
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discretionary accruals reported by benchmark beaters. Versions of the Jones (1991) model and 
modified Jones (1995) model are also tested for comparison purposes. 
 
The magnitude of earnings management conducted by benchmark beaters in the Australian 
market has not been clearly quantified. This thesis has identified distribution of earnings 
approaches and accrual based models which can provide incremental information in relation to 
the degree of earnings management conducted by benchmark beaters. Managers certainly have 
economic incentives to manage their earnings to acquire positive earnings and positive earnings 
change benchmarks. Failure to detect earnings management around earnings benchmarks could 
be related to the relative power of the earnings management tests used to measure earnings 
management. The hypothesis for this study is as follows: 
 
H1: Benchmark beater firms have lower discretionary accruals quality compared to non-
benchmark beaters 
 
This chapter has reviewed the earnings management literature from three different perspectives 
including distributions of earnings, accrual based models and the ability of accrual based 
models to capture earnings management. The hypothesis was identified, and research techniques 
were identified which can provide incremental information regarding the association between 
benchmark beaters and earnings management. The following chapter outlines the research 
methods used to test the hypothesis developed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Research Method 
Research Design 
Earnings management is likely to occur when managers have the strongest incentives and 
rewards for manipulating earnings. Prior research has identified two earnings performance 
benchmarks where managers have an incentive to manage earnings. These are positive earnings 
and positive earnings changes (Degeorge et al. 1999; Burgstahler et al. 1997). To test the 
hypothesis that benchmark beaters manage their earnings the Dechow et al. (2002) accrual 
quality model is applied to determine the extent of earnings management by Australian firms. 
The analyses are conducted using data available from direct operating cash flow reports of 
Australian companies. 
 
Sample and Data 
The sample consists of companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange in 2007. Data 
for the analyses were collated from the Aspect FinAnalysis database including financial 
information and Basic EPS data. Prior to 2009, companies were required to report the direct 
cash flow method within their Statement of Cash Flows. As the data from direct cash flow 
reporting is critical to the analysis, 2007 was selected as the most recent and appropriate year to 
test earnings management by Australian firms. Due to unusual volatile financial conditions with 
the onset of the global financial crisis, 2008 was not selected as the test year. Three years of 
data from 2006 to 2008 were required to estimate accruals quality for 2007 due to the 
requirement of lag and lead operating cash flow data. Of the 1853 listed companies in 2007, 528 
companies were excluded due to missing data. This left a final sample of 1325 companies. 
Evaluation of the different accrual based models requires a rich data source because of the 
number of variables required. A trade-off exists between assessing simple models that maximise 
32 
 
a sample size and more detailed accrual based models which have greater data requirements 
(Jones et al. 2008). Sample size therefore varies slightly in the analyses due to the varying data 
requirements of each accrual based model used. Relevant sample sizes are shown in the various 
tables reporting results.  
 
Benchmark Beating Analyses 
In testing our accrual based models, an appropriate interval width needs to be identified that 
effectively captures the positive earnings and changes in earnings group. An interval width is 
chosen that provides an accurate density estimate, balanced against the necessity for detail. An 
interval that is too large can conceal essential detail, whilst smaller intervals can be adversely 
impacted by idiosyncratic noise (Holland et al. 2003). For comparability, initial tests are 
conducted following interval widths used by Coulton et al. (2005) and Holland et al. (2003). An 
interval width of one per cent of Net Profit after Tax (NPAT) deflated by opening period total 
assets is implemented for small positive earnings (Holland et al. 2003). Moreover, an interval 
width of half a per cent is used to calculate positive earnings changes, where a change in NPAT 
is deflated by opening period total assets for the period of 2006 to 2007. 
 
In addition to testing for earnings management within the context of small positive NPAT and 
small positive changes in NPAT, tests are repeated using accrual based models on firms 
reporting small positive Basic EPS and small changes in Basic EPS. Again, an interval width is 
chosen that will most likely include firms that have managed earnings. An interval width of one 
cent-per-share for small positive earnings is used; that is, greater than zero cents per share and 
less than or equal to one cent-per-share. An interval width of one cent-per-share has also been 
chosen for positive earnings changes with an interval created at greater than zero cents per share 
to less than or equal to one cent-per-share.  
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The reported Basic EPS data is calculated within Australia under accounting standard 
AASB133 EPS. The Australian standard is the equivalent of International Accounting Standard 
IAS33 Earnings per Share1. The standard requires Basic EPS to be calculated as follows. 
 
Basic EPS = (Earnings – Preference Dividends) / Weighted Average Number of Shares         (1) 
 
Preference dividends are excluded from the Basic EPS calculation due to Basic EPS being 
calculated from the perspective of the ordinary shareholder. It is significant that the Basic EPS 
measure uses weighted average ordinary shares in the denominator of the calculation. The 
weighted average number of ordinary shares for the period is the number of ordinary shares at 
the beginning of the period, adjusted by the number of ordinary shares bought back or issued 
during the period, multiplied by a time weighting factor. The time weighting factor is the 
number of days the shares are outstanding as a proportion of the total number of days in the 
period (AASB 133, paragraph 20). Furthermore, ordinary shares that are issued as mandatory 
convertible instruments are included in the Basic EPS calculation from the date the contract is 
entered in to (AASB 133, paragraph 23).  
  
  
                                                            
1 The IFRS are adopted in Australia. The standard is issued by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) 
as AASB133 Earnings Per Share. 
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Accrual Quality Models 
Versions of the Dechow et al. (2002) accruals quality model are the focus of this study. The 
models determine accruals quality by assessing how well accruals estimate actual cash flows. 
The approach involves the application of a regression of current period changes in working 
capital on past, present and future period operating cash flows. The regression residual measures 
the portion of accruals that do not estimate actual cash flows, providing a relatively direct 
measure of the quality of accruals. A larger regression residual identifies poorer quality accruals. 
The original Dechow et al. (2002) model is shown in equation (2) below.  
∆WC t = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt                                                             (2) 
Where: 
∆WC t = change in working capital accruals measured by the change in accounts receivable, 
inventory, accounts payable, taxes payable and other current assets. 
CFOt-1 = cash flow from operations in t-1. 
CFOt = cash flow from operations in t. 
CFOt+1 = cash flow from operations in t+1. 
 
The dependent variable, ∆WC is the change in working capital accruals in period t measured by 
the change in accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable, taxes payable and other current 
assets. The independent variables are prior-year, present-year, and one-year-ahead net cash flow 
from operations. The regression residual or error term provides the measure of accruals quality; 
it represents the portion of accruals that does not closely estimate actual cash flows. Dechow et 
al. (2002) calculate the standard deviation of the yearly regression residuals over a five year 
period to measure accruals quality. Alternatively, they also refer to the absolute value of the 
residual for that year as an appropriate measure for accruals quality. This study uses the 
absolute value of the residual for 2007 as a measure for accruals quality. 
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McNichols (2002) develops a variation of the Dechow et al. (2002) model that includes the 
change in sales and the size of property, plant and equipment for the current period. These 
variables were used in the Jones (1991) model and according to McNichols (2002), are 
important to forming expectations about current accruals above the contribution of operating 
cash flows. McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. (2005) show an improvement in model fit by 
augmenting the original Dechow et al. (2002) model with these variables. The model is 
displayed in Equation 3 below. 
∆WC t = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + β4∆SALESt + β5PPEt + εt                     (3) 
Where: 
∆WC t = change in working capital accruals measured by the change in accounts receivable, 
inventory, accounts payable, taxes payable and other current assets. 
CFOt-1 = cash flow from operations in t-1. 
CFOt = cash flow from operations in t. 
CFOt+1 = cash flow from operations in t+1. 
∆SALESt = change in sales from t-1 to t. 
PPEt = property plant and equipment reported at t. 
 
The McNichols (2002) version of the Dechow et al. (2002) model is applied to Australian firms 
listed on the securities exchange for 2007. 
 
Regressions conducted using the Dechow et al. (2002) model and McNichols version of the 
Dechow et al. (2002) model are augmented to distinguish between accruals quality impacted by 
innate factors of the firm and accruals quality impacted by management discretion. Innate 
factors of the firm refer to the business environment and business model of the firm, which 
result in estimation error. For example, length of operating cycle is an innate factor which 
adversely impacts the accruals quality of a firm where a longer operating cycle reduces accruals 
quality. As opposed to accruals quality which is due to management discretion (Francis et al. 
2005). Four summary indicators are regressed against the initial residual from equation 2 to 
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control for accruals quality which is influenced by the firm’s fundamental business factors. The 
indicators are originally identified by Dechow et al. (2002) and used in the Francis et al. (2005) 
study. The indicators or innate factors include firm size, frequency of negative earnings, length 
of operating cycle and volatility of operating revenue. 
 
Francis et al. (2005) also include the standard deviation of operating cash flow as a proxy for 
volatility of operating environment. This study only uses the standard deviation of operating 
revenue as our proxy to avoid multicollinearity problems. The analyses were performed using 
the standard deviation of operating cash flow and results were qualitatively similar. The model 
and proxies used for the four summary indicators are displayed in equation 4 below. 
AQ = β0 + β1SIZE + β2FREQLOSS + β3OPCYC + β4OPREV + εt                                                 (4) 
Where: 
AQ = Accruals quality (regression residual error for 2007).  
SIZE = Natural log of total assets for 2007 
FREQLOSS = If the firm incurred a loss from 2005 to 2007 
OPCYC = Natural log of average age of inventory plus the average age of receivables (in days) 
2006 and 2007, (365 days) 
CFVOL = Standard deviation of cash flow divided by total assets for 2006 to 2008. 
OPREV = Standard deviation of operating revenue divided by total assets for 2006 to 2008. 
 
The regression error term calculated from the second part regression estimates the firm’s 
portion of accruals quality error that can be attributed to discretionary earnings management. 
The predicted value is the innate accruals quality measure. 
 
Discretionary accruals are calculated using the Jones model and modified Jones model to allow 
for comparison with the Dechow et al. (2002) model and prior studies. The Jones (1991) model 
assesses aggregate accruals by calculating the prediction error of total accruals from prior 
periods. Equation 5 calculates non-discretionary accruals using the original Jones (1991) model.  
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NDAC = B0 + B1(∆ OPREVt) + B2*PPEt + εt                                                                           (5) 
Where: 
 
NDAC = Non-discretionary Accruals quality (regression residual error for 2007)  
∆ OPREVt = Operating revenue in year t less operating revenue in year t-1 scaled by total 
assets at t-1 
PPEt = Property plant and equipment reported at t 
Each variable is scaled by beginning of year total assets 
 
Non-discretionary accruals calculated by the Jones (1991) model (equation 5) are used to 
calculate discretionary accruals for the Jones (1991) model. This calculation is outlined below 
in Equation 6. 
DA = TACC – NDAC                                                                                                            (6) 
Where: 
DA = Discretionary accruals quality 
TACC = Total Accruals 
NDAC = Non-Discretionary Accruals 
Total accruals = Net Profit after tax – Cash flow from operations 
 
Previously, the Jones model had implied that discretion over revenues during the estimation 
period and the period being assessed did not occur (Dechow et al. 1995). The modified Jones 
model (1995) incorporates the change in receivables with the change in revenues in the event 
period. Non-discretionary accruals are calculated below in equation 7 using the modified Jones 
model (1995).  
NDAC = B0 + B1(∆ OPREVt - ∆ REC) + B2 PPEt + εt                                                             (7) 
Where: 
NDAC = Non-Discretionary Accruals quality (regression residual error for 2007)  
∆ OPREVt = Operating revenue in year t less operating revenue in year t-1 scaled by total 
assets at t-1 
∆ REC = Net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1 scales by total assets at t-1 
PPEt = Property plant and equipment reported at t 
Each variable is scaled by beginning of year total assets 
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Discretionary accruals calculated by the modified Jones model (1995) are outlined below in 
equation 8. 
DA = TACC – NDAC                                                                                                            (8) 
Where: 
DA = Discretionary accruals quality 
TACC = Total Accruals 
NDAC = Non-Discretionary Accruals 
Total accruals = Net Profit after tax – Cash flow from operations 
 
Table 1 provides description of each accruals quality measure used in this study. 
Table 1 
Description of Accruals Quality and Earnings Quality Measures 
 
DDMCNINN Francis et al. version of Dechow and Dichev (2005). Accrual based 
model calculating the accruals quality of firms with control variables 
included for innate characteristics of firms. The measure is the predicted 
value from equation 4. 
DDMCNDISC Francis et al. version of Dechow and Dichev (2005). Accrual based 
model calculating the discretionary component of accruals quality. The 
measure is the error term from equation 4. 
MCNDD McNichols version of Dechow and Dichev (2002). Accrual based model 
calculating the accruals quality of firms. The measure is the error term 
from equation 3. 
JONESDISC Jones model (1991). Measure of discretionary accruals quality. See 
equation 5 and 6. 
MODJONESDISC Modified Jones model (1995). Measure of discretionary accruals quality. 
See equation 7 and 8. 
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Earnings Measures for Benchmark Beating Tests 
Earnings management is likely to be reflected in a larger than expected number of firms 
reporting small positive earnings and small positive earnings changes. These discontinuities 
have previously been explained by firms managing earnings based on frequently used 
benchmarks (Holland et al. 2003; Burgstahler et al. 1997). Other researchers have questioned 
the effect of deflators used in prior studies. Specifically, they question whether the 
discontinuities around zero are the result of earnings management or simply that the deflator 
used in the study is accentuating the observed discontinuity at zero (Durtschi et al. 2005; 
Durtschi et al. 2009). Due to these contrasting views within the literature, distribution of 
earnings is measured using NPAT without deflation and Basic EPS. These two earnings metrics 
(NPAT and Basic EPS) are identified as measures that will provide a more accurate analysis of 
the distribution of earnings (Durtschi et al. 2009). 
 
EPS is an important measure within the context of evaluating distributions of earnings because 
it does not require deflation to evaluate the distribution around zero (Degeorge et al. 1999). 
Recently, EPS has been established as a valid measure that may be used as evidence of earnings 
management when evaluating distributions of earnings around zero (Durtschi et al. 2009). EPS 
is widely used as a measure of performance and it controls for the effects of differential pricing 
between profit and loss firms, which can occur when using price, total assets or market value as 
a deflator (Coulton et al. 2005).  
 
NPAT is another earnings metric used in this study to establish evidence of earnings 
management through earnings distribution measures. NPAT is not deflated in this study as this 
can create differential pricing between profit and loss firms. Durtschi et al. (2009) establish 
NPAT as a credible earnings proxy to use for earnings distribution tests. 
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Aligning the EPS measure with previous earnings management studies, Basic EPS data is 
collated from the Aspect FinAnalysis database (Coulton et al. 2005). Frequently, prior studies 
have normalized EPS by deflators such as price per share and assets per share in an attempt to 
standardize the observations. Importantly, EPS is not a deflated variable, it is simply the income 
due to the owner of each share (Durtschi et al. 2005). For this study, the Basic EPS figure has 
not been standardized because of the spurious patterns that can occur due to the EPS figure 
being rounded to the nearest cent. This rounding of the EPS figure can create a nontrivial 
amount of EPS observations amounting to zero (Degeorge et al. 1999).  
 
In testing the distribution of earnings, histograms are used to graphically represent the pooled 
cross-sectional data collected for Australian firms listed on the securities exchange for 2007. To 
assess whether a discontinuity at zero exists, an appropriate interval width must be chosen that 
effectively captures our benchmark beaters. An interval width is recommended that is positively 
related to the variability of the data and negatively related to the number of observations 
(Silverman, 1986; Scott, 1992). Freedman and Diaconis (1981) recommend an interval width 
that has previously been applied by Degeorge et al. (1999) in an earnings management setting, 
which is calculated as follows: 
2(IQR)n-1/3                                                                                                                            (9) 
Where: 
 
IQR is the interquartile range in sample 
n is the number of sample observations  
 
Given the sample an interval width of greater than zero cents per share to less than or equal to 
one cent per share is used. This interval width provides meaningful comparison with previous 
studies (Coulton et al. 2005; Durtschi et al. 2005). The focus is on the first interval above zero 
excluding all zero Basic EPS measures from the sample (Degeorge et al. 1999; Durtschi et al. 
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2005). Exclusion of the zero Basic EPS measures avoids the complexity of misclassifying zero 
EPS measures as either a profit or a loss. Thirty-two companies with zero EPS figures are 
excluded from the analysis. 
 
To evaluate the statistical significance of the results, a test needs to be applied to establish 
whether there is a discontinuity in the distribution of earnings observations, proxied by Basic 
EPS and NPAT. If earnings management is occurring, an above average number of 
observations would be expected just above the zero threshold for small positive earnings and 
small positive earnings changes. Following Burgstahler et al. (1997), an assumption is made 
that the cross-sectional distribution of earnings and earnings changes are relatively smooth. 
Applying this assumption, the test statistic for an interval is calculated as the difference between 
the actual and expected number of observations for an interval, divided by the estimated 
standard deviation of the difference (the standardised differences are assumed to be distributed 
approximately normal) (Burgstahler et al. 1997; Holland et al. 2003). The estimated standard 
deviation is calculated as follows: 
 
Npi (1-pi) + (1/4)N(pi-1+pi+1)(1-pi-1-pi+1)                                                                                  (10) 
 
Where: 
 
N is the number of observations 
pi is the probability an observation will fall into i, by pi 
To calculate the expected number of observations for a given interval, the average of the two 
immediately adjacent intervals is used.  
 
The assumption of a linear curve can create some noise in the test statistic due to a normal 
curve being non-linear. The test statistic assumes a linear curve because it calculates the 
expected number of observations in an interval based on the average of the two immediately 
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adjacent intervals. However, this noise can be reduced by using smaller interval widths and 
limiting the number of intervals used to calculate the expected frequency of observations within 
an interval (Holland et al. 2003). Furthermore, using the two adjacent intervals as an estimate of 
the expected number of observations in a given interval can be potentially problematic. Given 
that the hypothesis is expecting companies are trying to avoid reporting losses or earnings 
decreases, firms are likely to shift from one interval to the next, in the majority of cases 
(Holland et al. 2003). To avoid these issues, alternative approaches can be implemented to 
calculate the number of expected observations within an interval. Two approaches used by 
Burgstahler et al. (1997) include calculating the test interval based on the average of the next-
to-adjacent intervals and using the average of the four adjacent intervals to calculate the 
expected frequency of the test interval. These two additional approaches solve for the impact of 
firms shifting from one interval to the next although they are likely to compound issues in 
relation to the assumption of a linear curve.  
 
For comparison reasons, the test statistic used by previous Australian researchers is used, which 
involves calculating the test statistic using the immediate adjacent intervals (Coulton et al. 2005; 
Holland et al. 2003).  
 
This chapter has described the sample and methodology that will be implemented in this thesis. 
The distribution of earnings tests and accrual based models which will be used to test for 
earnings management by ASX listed firms were outlined in this chapter. The following chapter 
reports results of analysis outlined in this chapter.  
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Chapter 4 Results 
This section reports descriptive statistics, results for distribution of earnings tests and 
hypothesis testing using accrual based models. Additional analysis using earnings persistence 
tests is also conducted to evaluate the validity of the results reported by the accrual based 
models. Each earnings management test completed evaluates positive earnings and positive 
earnings change benchmarks.  
Descriptive Statistics – Benchmark Beaters, Just Miss Firms and Other Firms  
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics – Benchmark Beaters  
Panel A: Benchmark Beaters (n = 81) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
Continuous Variables      
Total assets (000’s)    38 446 62 509       1 200   208 02 391 503 
CFO2006 -0.08 0.45 -2.43 0.01 0.44 
CFO2007 0.01 0.14 -0.69 0.01 0.44 
CFO2008 -0.04 0.19 -1.13 -0.02 0.19 
∆SALES 0.12 0.23 -0.42 0.67 0.76 
PPE 0.23 0.25 0.00 0.13 1.00 
OPCYC 116.50 110.45 0.00 86.01 457.77 
OPREV 0.30 0.45 0.00 0.15 2.37 
Categorical Variables (Yes=0) (No=1)    
FREQLOSS 74.25% 25.75%    
Panel B: Other Firms(n=1244) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
Total assets (000’s) 1003 604 5720 266       42     417 29 564 634 000
CFO2006 -0.11 0.40 -2.43 -0.01 0.48
CFO2007 -0.10 0.38 -2.29 -0.01 0.50
CFO2008 -0.13 0.59 -4.28 0.00 0.53
∆SALES 0.09 0.33 -1.16 0.03 1.51
PPE 0.29 0.30 0.00 0.17 1.00
OPCYC 111.05 130.79 0.00 73.38 730.00
OPREV 0.20 0.35 0.00 0.08 2.37
Categorical Variables (Yes=0) (No=1)   
FREQLOSS 53.50% 46.50%   
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Panel C: Just Miss Firms (n=131) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
Total assets (000’s) 358 25 97 343       44     111 74 908 283 
CFO2006 -0.37 0.58 -2.43 -0.17 0.48
CFO2007 -0.24 0.43 -2.29 -0.11 0.20
CFO2008 -0.26 0.63 -4.28 -0.06 0.53
∆SALES 0.07 0.33 -1.16 0.01 1.51
PPE 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.06 1.00
OPCYC 100.87 139.39 0.00 49.14 730.00
OPREV 0.21 0.45 0.00 0.05 2.37
Categorical Variables (Yes=0) (No=1)   
FREQLOSS 100% 0%   
 
Where: 
 
Total Assets = (Opening Assets + Closing Assets)/2  
CFO2006 = Cash flow from operations for 2006 
CFO2007 = Cash flow from operations for 2007 
CFO2008 = Cash flow from operations for 2008 
∆SALESt = change in sales from t-1 to t. 
PPEt = property plant and equipment reported at t 
OPCYC = Natural log of average age of inventory plus the average age of receivables (in days) 
2006 and 2007, (365 days) 
OPREV = Standard deviation of operating revenue divided by total assets for 2006 to 2008. 
FREQLOSS =If the firm incurred a loss from 2005 to 2007 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables included in the accrual quality models. 
Panel A, shows descriptive statistics for benchmark beaters with an average cash flow from 
operations for 2007 (CFO2007) at 0.01. This is expected given the benchmark beaters report 
small positive earnings. Change in sales (∆SALES) is positive for the 2006 to 2007 period with 
a mean of 0.12 and the mean operating cycle (OPCYC) for 2007 is 116.50 days. Lastly, 74.25 
per cent of benchmark beaters incurred a loss from 2005 to 2007 (FREQLOSS). 
 
Results reported in Panel B show the descriptive statistics for other firms, with a mean for cash 
flows from operations for 2007 (CFO2007) at -0.10. The mean for cash flow from operations is 
also similar for the prior and subsequent years with a mean of -0.11 for CFO2006 and a mean of 
-0.13 for CFO2008. Change in sales (∆SALES) has a positive mean for 2007 at 0.09 and the 
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standard deviation of operating revenue (OPREV) is less for other firms compared to 
benchmark beaters with a mean of 0.20. Table 2, Panel B shows the frequency loss 
(FREQLOSS) for other firms is 53.50 per cent, indicating that from 2005 to 2007 just over half 
of other firms incurred a loss. 
 
Table 2, Panel C outlines the descriptive statistics for just miss firms. The mean cash flow from 
operations (CFO2007) is negative for 2007 at -0.24. This negative mean is expected given that 
just miss firms report small earnings losses. The mean change in sales (∆SALES) is positive for 
just miss firms at 0.07 and mean operating cycle (OPCYC) is 100.87 days. Just miss firms has a 
very similar mean operating revenue (OPREV) compared to other firms with an average of 0.21 
compared to 0.20 for other firms. The frequency loss (FREQLOSS) is 100 per cent for other 
firms given that they all report small losses. 
 
Results  
Earnings Distribution tests 
Earnings distribution tests are conducted to measure the number of firms that narrowly achieve 
positive earnings and positive earnings change benchmarks. A larger than expected number of 
firms immediately above zero indicates that firms are manipulating their earnings to achieve 
those earnings benchmarks. The main analysis of this study considers whether benchmark 
beaters have higher discretionary accruals compared to just miss firms and other firms. 
However, prior to presenting this analysis, evidence is provided as to whether a discontinuity 
exists at zero for positive earnings and positive earnings change benchmarks. Earnings 
measures used to conduct distribution of earnings tests are NPAT and Basic EPS. 
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Figure 4 demonstrates the distribution of changes in earnings for ASX companies based on EPS 
results from 2006 to 2007. Visual comparison of the immediate one cent interval either side of 
zero indicates that the number of firms in the immediate interval above zero and the immediate 
interval below zero are similar. The t-statistic is significant for the one cent interval 
immediately above zero (t=16.00 and p=0.00). However, the t-statistic is also significant for the 
one cent interval below zero (t=16.63 and p=0.00). Additional analysis using half cent intervals 
also yields t-statistics which are significant for each half a cent per share immediately above 
and below zero. 
 
In summary, for the earnings distribution tests there was little or no evidence suggesting that 
Australian firms are managing their earnings to achieve positive earnings and positive earnings 
changes. Prior Australian studies including Holland et al. (2003) and Coulton et al. (2005) 
identified discontinuities at zero for positive earnings and earnings changes. However, the 
deflators used by Holland et al. (2003) and Coulton et al. (2005) have been identified by 
subsequent research as potentially having accentuated the discontinuity at zero. This study has 
used two earnings metrics including NPAT without scaling and Basic EPS. These two earnings 
metrics have been identified as providing incremental information using earnings distribution 
tests (Durtschi et al. 2009). Using Basic EPS and NPAT without scaling, discontinuities have 
not been identified at zero for positive earnings or positive earnings changes.  
 
The next section of analysis examines whether those firms that fall in to the category of 
benchmark beaters have lower earnings quality measures. Accrual quality models will be used 
to test the hypothesis that benchmark beaters on average report higher discretionary accruals 
compared to just miss firms and other firms.  
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Results –Accrual Based Models 
Accrual based models are used to test the hypothesis that benchmark beating firms have lower 
discretionary accruals quality compared to non-benchmark beating firms. While versions of the 
Dechow et al. (2002) accruals quality model are the focus of this study, measures of earnings 
quality using the Jones model (1991) are included for comparison purposes and to further 
validate results. Companies falling in to the first two intervals above zero for small positive 
earnings and small positive earnings changes (intervals 1 and 2) are identified as benchmark 
beaters. Recall that benchmark beaters are expected to manage earnings upwards to achieve 
benchmarks. The analysis tests if benchmark beating firms have lower earnings quality 
compared to non-benchmark beating firms. Non-benchmark beating firms are identified as just 
miss firms and other firms. Just miss firms fall in to the first two intervals below zero (intervals 
-1 and -2) and other firms include all other firms that are not benchmark beaters.  
 
Table 3 provides results of comparisons of earnings quality measures for benchmark beating 
firms, just miss firms and other firms based on firms reporting a positive earnings result for 
NPAT. Table 4 shows results of tests for reporting a positive earnings change (NPAT). Table 5 
presents results for benchmark beaters, just miss firms and other firms based on firms reporting 
a positive result for Basic EPS. Lastly, Table 6 shows results to identify whether benchmark 
beaters manage their earnings to report a positive Basic EPS change. 
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Table 3: Positive Earnings (NPAT) 
Panel A: Benchmark Beaters compared to all other firms 
                          
                                Benchmark Beaters                      Others Firms               Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 42 0.07 0.07 970 0.09 0.09 -2.92 0.01 
DDMCNDISC 38 0.08 0.06 908 0.07 0.05 -0.36 0.72 
MCNDD 70 0.12 0.05 117 0.09 0.04 1.46 0.07 
JONESDISC 28 0.01 0.03 941 -0.01 0.00 -0.11 0.91 
MODJONESDISC 28 0.02 0.04 940 0.00 0.00 -.13 0.90 
 
Panel B: Benchmark Beaters compared to just miss firms 
                          
                                Benchmark Beaters                     Just Miss Firms            Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 42 0.07 0.07 26 0.07 0.07 -0.45 0.66 
DDMCNDISC 38 0.08 0.06 21 0.07 0.05 0.30 0.77 
MCNDD 70 0.06 0.02 28 0.10 0.04 -0.94 0.35 
JONESDISC 28 0.01 0.03 23 0.12 0.03 -1.39 0.09 
MODJONESDISC 28 0.02 0.04 22 0.13 0.03 -1.60 0.06 
 
Panel C: Just miss firms compared to other firms 
                          
                                Just Miss Firms                           Other firms                   Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 42 0.07 0.07 986 0.09 0.09 1.88 0.03 
DDMCNDISC 38 0.07 0.06 925 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.89 
MCNDD 70 0.96 0.04 104 0.09 0.04 -0.14 0.88 
JONESDISC 23 0.12 0.03 946 -0.02 0.03 -1.63 0.06 
MODJONESDISC 22 0.13 0.03 946 0.00 0.00 -1.69 0.05 
 
Accrual measures for benchmark beating firms (small positive profit), intervals 1 and 2, 
compared to other firms (Panel A), compared to small loss firms (intervals -1 and -2) (Panel B) 
Other firms include non-benchmark beating firms for each particular test 
Each interval is 1% of NPAT scaled by Total Assets 
Two tailed tests of significance reported if the direction is predicted  
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Where: 
DDMCNINN = Francis et al. version, of Dechow and Dichev model (2005) - Innate Accruals  
DDMCNDISC = Francis et al. version of Dechow and Dichev model (2005) - Discretionary 
Accruals 
MCNDD = McNichols version of Dechow and Dichev model (2002) – Accruals Quality 
JONESDISC = Jones model (1991) - Discretionary Accruals 
MODJONESDISC = Modified Jones model (1995) – Discretionary Accruals 
 
Accrual Based Models – Positive Earnings (NPAT) 
NPAT scaled by total assets is the earnings metric used in Table 3 to define benchmark beaters, 
just miss firms and other firms. Table 3, Panel A reports comparisons of accruals quality of 
benchmark beaters against other firms. Other firms are the non-benchmark beating firms in 
Table 3, panel A. The MCNDD measure reports significantly lower accruals quality for 
benchmark beaters as opposed to other firms (t=1.46 and p=0.07). However, the DDMCNDISC 
measure does not report significantly higher discretionary accruals for benchmark beaters 
compared to the other firms. 
 
The DDMCNDISC model reports a more reliable and valid measure for discretionary accruals 
because the DDMCNDISC model controls for additional variables which impact accruals 
quality, further isolating discretionary accruals reported by firms. The analysis in Table 3, Panel 
A does not support the hypothesis that benchmark beaters have lower discretionary accruals 
quality. Benchmark beaters do not demonstrate on average a lower discretionary accruals 
quality compared to other firms in a small positive earnings context. 
 
Table 3, Panel B compares benchmark beaters to just miss firms. Just miss firms fall in to the 
first two intervals immediately below zero (i.e. -1 and -2), which represent minus one per cent 
and minus two per cent of NPAT, scaled by total assets. The DDMCNDISC measure is not 
significantly different for benchmark beaters compared to just miss firms, with a mean of 0.08 
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and 0.07 respectively (Table 3, Panel B). However, the JONESDISC measure reports higher 
discretionary accruals for just miss firms as opposed to benchmark beaters, with a t-statistic of -
1.39 and value of p=0.09. The MODJONESDISC model also reports higher discretionary 
accruals for just miss firms (t=-1.39 and p=0.06). 
 
This finding of higher discretionary accruals for just miss firms does not support the hypothesis 
which predicted higher discretionary accruals for benchmark beaters. It is possible that the 
higher discretionary measures reported by the JONESDISC and MODJONESDISC measure for 
just miss firms are being driven by nondiscretionary factors. McNichols (2002) indicates that 
estimates of discretionary accruals based on the Jones model are likely to include a substantial 
component of nondiscretionary accruals. Table 3, Panel B does not support the hypothesis that 
benchmark beaters will have higher discretionary accruals than just miss firms. 
 
Table 3, Panel C compares just miss firms to all other firms. The JONESDISC measure reports 
higher discretionary accruals for just miss firms compared to other firms at a marginal 
significance level of 0.06. The MODJONESDISC measure also reports higher discretionary 
accruals for just miss firms compared to others firms at a significance level of 0.05. Versions of 
the Dechow et al. (2002) model in Panel C, Table 3 do not report significantly different 
discretionary accruals for just miss firms compared to other firms. For example, the 
DDMCNDISC measure indicates the same magnitude of discretionary accruals for just miss 
firms and other firms with mean discretionary accruals of 0.07 for just miss firms and other 
firms.  
 
Additional results in Table 3, Panel C report significantly higher innate accruals for just miss 
firms compared to other firms using the DDMCNINN measure at t=-1.88 and p=0.03. These 
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significant results reported by the DDMCNINN measure relate to the quality of accruals for 
firms which are impacted by fundamental factors of the firm and not accruals quality impacted 
by discretionary decisions of management. The results reported in Table 3, Panel C do not 
provide support for the hypothesis that benchmark beaters manage their earnings more 
significantly that just miss firms. 
 
In summary, the results do not suggest that benchmark beaters manage their earnings to report a 
positive NPAT performance. Overall, results do not support the hypothesis which states that 
benchmark beaters are expected to have on average a higher level of discretionary accruals 
compared to other firms and just miss firms.  
 
Accrual Based Models – Positive Earnings Changes (NPAT) 
Table 4 reports results to determine whether companies listed on the ASX manage their 
earnings to beat earnings reported in the previous year. Similar to the assessment of firms 
reporting small positive earnings, firms who report small earnings increases are identified as 
benchmark beaters. Benchmark beaters are defined as firms who fall in to intervals 1 and 2 with 
each interval constructed as half a per cent of the change in NPAT, scaled by total assets. Just 
miss firms fall in to intervals just below zero (intervals -1 and -2) and other firms represent non-
benchmark beaters for each test conducted. 
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Table 4: Positive Earnings Changes (NPAT) 
Panel A: Benchmark Beaters compared to all other firms 
                          
                                Benchmark Beaters                      Other Firms                 Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 65 0.07 0.07 947 0.09 0.09 4.85 0.00 
DDMCNDISC 61 0.05 0.04 885 0.07 0.05 4.26 0.00 
MCNDD 62 0.04 0.03 100 0.10 0.04 6.83 0.00 
JONESDISC 55 0.05 0.03 914 -0.02 -0.01 -2.30 0.02 
MODJONESDISC 55 0.05 0.03 913 0.00 0.00 -1.54 0.06 
 
Panel B: Benchmark Beaters compared to just miss firms (positive earnings changes) 
                          
                                Benchmark Beaters                     Just Miss Firms            Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 65 0.07 0.07 52 0.07 0.08 0.62 0.54 
DDMCNDISC 61 0.05 0.04 49 0.06 0.03 0.96 0.34 
MCNDD 62 0.04 0.03 55 0.06 0.02 1.18 0.24 
JONESDISC 55 0.05 0.03 47 0.03 0.04 -0.36 0.72 
MODJONESDISC 55 0.05 0.03 47 0.03 0.04 -0.44 0.67 
 
Panel C: Just miss firms compared to other firms (positive earnings changes) 
                          
                                Just Miss Firms                           Other firms                   Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 52 0.07 0.08 960 0.09 0.09 3.56 0.00 
DDMCNDISC 49 0.06 0.03 897 0.07 0.05 0.69 0.49 
MCNDD 55 0.06 0.02 105 0.09 0.04 2.00 0.05 
JONESDISC 47 0.03 0.04 922 -0.01 -0.01 -0.41 0.68 
MODJONESDISC 47 0.03 0.04 911 0.00 0.00 -0.21 0.84 
 
Accrual measures for benchmark beating firms (small earnings changes), intervals 1 and 2, 
compared to other firms (Panel A), compared to small loss firms (intervals -1 and -2) (Panel B) 
Other firms include non-benchmark beating firms for each particular test 
Each interval is a 0.5% change in NPAT scaled by Total Assets 
Two tailed tests of significance if the direction is predicted  
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Where: 
DDMCNINN = Francis et al. version, of Dechow and Dichev model (2005) - Innate Accruals  
DDMCNDISC = Francis et al. version of Dechow and Dichev model (2005) - Discretionary 
Accruals 
MCNDD = McNichols version of Dechow and Dichev model (2002) – Accruals Quality 
JONESDISC = Jones model (1991) - Discretionary Accruals 
MODJONESDISC = Modified Jones model (1995) – Discretionary Accruals 
 
Table 4, Panel A indicates conflicting results between versions of the Dechow et al. models and 
versions of the Jones models. The DDMCNDISC measure shows that other firms have 
significantly lower accruals quality compared to benchmark beaters (t=4.26 and p=0.00). The 
MCNDD measure also reports lower accruals quality for other firms against benchmark beaters 
(t=6.83 and p=0.00). In contrast the JONESDISC measure shows significantly lower accruals 
quality for benchmark beaters compared to other firms (t=-2.30 and p=0.02). The 
MODJONESDISC measure also indicates that benchmark beaters have higher discretionary 
accruals (lower accrual quality) compared to other firms, although this measure is only 
marginally significant at t= -1.54 and p=0.06.  
 
The contrasting results reported in Table 4, Panel A could be potentially impacted by the small 
sample used in these tests. When testing accrual models, small samples are required to detect 
economically plausible levels of earnings management. However, inconsistent results can be a 
limitation of smaller samples. The DDMCNDISC result does not support the hypothesis of this 
study and reports higher discretionary accruals for other firms compared to benchmark beaters 
in the context of small positive earnings changes. 
 
Table 4, Panel B does not show any significant results when comparing benchmark beaters to 
just miss firms in the context of small positive earnings changes. Results show that 
discretionary earnings for benchmark beaters are not significantly different to discretionary 
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earnings for just miss firms. It was expected that benchmark beaters would have on average a 
higher level of discretionary accruals compared to just miss firms.  
 
Additional tests in Table 4, Panel C compare accruals quality for just miss firms and other firms. 
The DDMCNINN measure shows significantly higher innate accruals for the other firms 
compared to the just miss firms (t= 3.56 and p=0.00). However, this does not provide any 
incremental information regarding discretionary earnings. Table 3, Panel C does not give any 
additional support for benchmark beaters being earnings managers.  
 
Given the mixed results in Table 4, Panel A and the lack of significant results in Panel B and C 
of Table 4, it cannot be concluded that benchmark beating firms manage their NPAT earnings 
to beat the previous year’s earnings benchmark. Table 4 does not support the hypothesis that 
benchmark beaters manage their earnings to report positive earnings changes. 
 
Accrual Based Models – Positive Earnings (Basic EPS) 
To further assess whether firms manage earnings to beat benchmarks, tests are conducted using 
EPS as the earnings metric. The tests compare firms reporting a small positive EPS and small 
positive earning changes (Basic EPS). Discretionary accruals for benchmark beaters are 
compared to other firms and just miss firms to test for earnings management. Benchmark 
beaters are defined as firms that report an EPS result between zero and one cent per share, with 
just miss firms reporting an EPS figure between zero and minus one cent per share. The other 
firms group includes any firm within the sample that is not included in the benchmark beater or 
just miss groups. 
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Table 5: Positive Earnings (Basic EPS) 
Panel A: Benchmark Beaters compared to all other firms (EPS – 1 cent) 
                          
                                Benchmark Beaters                     Other Firms                  Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 53 0.11 0.11 952 0.09 0.09 -4.43 0.00 
DDMCNDISC 50 0.10 0.08 879 0.07 0.05 -1.74 0.04 
MCNDD 54 0.13 0.06 984 0.09 0.04 -1.42 0.08 
JONESDISC 48 0.30 0.08 899 -0.01 0.00 -2.39 0.01 
MODJONESDISC 48 0.31 0.07 898 -0.02 0.00 -2.44 0.01 
 
Panel B: Benchmark Beaters compared to just miss firms (EPS – 1 cent)                          
 
                                Benchmark Beaters                     Just Miss Firms            Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 53 0.11 0.11 129 0.11 0.10 0.37 0.71 
DDMCNDISC 50 0.10 0.08 119 0.10 0.07 0.18 0.86 
MCNDD 54 0.13 0.06 146 0.10 0.04 0.77 0.44 
JONESDISC 48 0.30 0.08 139 0.04 0.00 1.87 0.03 
MODJONESDISC 48 0.31 0.07 139 0.06 0.01 1.77 0.04 
 
Panel C: Just miss firms compared to other firms (EPS – 1 cent) 
                      
                                Just Miss Firms                           Other firms                   Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 129 0.11 0.10 876 0.08 0.09 -6.63 0.00 
DDMCNDISC 119 0.10 0.07 810 0.07 0.05 -2.66 0.01 
MCNDD 146 0.10 0.04 892 0.09 0.04 -1.02 0.31 
JONESDISC 139 0.04 0.00 808 -0.02 0.00 -0.82 0.41 
MODJONESDISC 139 0.06 0.01 807 -0.01 0.00 -0.82 0.41 
 
Accrual measures for benchmark beating firms (small positive profit EPS), compared to other 
firms (Panel A), compared to small loss firms (Panel B) 
Other firms include non-benchmark beating firms for each particular test 
0 cents per share < Benchmark beaters ≤ 1 cent per share 
-1 cent per share ≤ Small loss firms < 0 cents per share 
0 EPS excluded from sample (33 EPS excluded from sample) 
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Two tailed tests of significance if the direction is predicted 
 
Where: 
DDMCNINN = Francis et al. version, of Dechow and Dichev model (2005) - Innate Accruals  
DDMCNDISC = Francis et al. version of Dechow and Dichev model (2005) - Discretionary 
Accruals 
MCNDD = McNichols version of Dechow and Dichev model (2002) – Accruals Quality 
JONESDISC = Jones model (1991) - Discretionary Accruals 
MODJONESDISC = Modified Jones model (1995) – Discretionary Accruals 
 
Table 5, Panel A indicates that the DDMCNDISC measure shows significantly higher 
discretionary accruals for benchmark beaters compared to other firms (t=-1.74 and p= 0.04). 
The JONESDISC and MODJONESDISC measures are also consistent with the results of the 
DDMCNDISC measure in Table 5, Panel A demonstrating significantly higher discretionary 
earnings for benchmark beaters as opposed to other firms. These results are significant for the 
JONEDISC measure and the MODJONESDISC measure (t=-2.39, p=0.01, and t=-2.44, p=0.01 
respectively). 
 
These results are interesting given that our previous tests using NPAT did not show higher 
discretionary accruals for benchmark beaters compared to other firms. The DDMCNDISC 
measure has been identified in this study as currently one of the most direct measures for 
capturing discretionary accruals. The MCNDD measure in Table 5, Panel A has mean accruals 
quality of 0.13, indicating lower accruals quality for benchmark beaters compared to other firms 
at a marginal significance (t=-1.42, p=0.08). In addition, the JONESDISC, MODJONESDISC 
measure and the MCNDD measure add further consistency to the results identified by the 
DDMCNDISC measure. The DDMCNDISC measure supports this study’s hypothesis, 
identifying benchmark beaters as having higher discretionary accruals compared to the other 
firms group.  
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Table 5, Panel B compares benchmark beaters to just miss firms, no significant difference is 
found between discretionary earnings for benchmark beaters or just miss firms using the 
DDMCNDISC measure. However, the JONESDISC and MODJONESDISC measures show 
significantly higher discretionary earnings for benchmark beaters compared to just miss firms 
(t=1.87, p=0.03 and t=1.77, p=0.04 respectively). 
 
In this case, comparing benchmark beaters to just miss firms does not provide clear evidence of 
earnings management by firms reporting a small positive EPS result between zero and one cent 
per share. While the discretionary accruals for the JONESDISC and MODJONESDISC 
measures are significantly higher for the benchmark beaters this is not supported by the 
DDMCNDISC model. Considering that research suggests that the DDMCNDISC measure has 
greater explanatory power than the Jones models, benchmark beaters cannot be highlighted as 
earnings managers in this instance (McNichols, 2002). Table 5, Panel B does not provide 
substantive support for the hypothesis that benchmark beaters have higher discretionary 
accruals.  
 
Table 5, Panel C compares just miss firms to other firms with no significant results highlighting 
a difference between discretionary earnings reported for just miss firms or other firms. Using 
the DDMCNINN measure, innate accruals are found to be significantly higher for just miss 
firms (t=-6.63, p=0.00). This information simply establishes that just miss firms have poorer 
quality accruals compared to other firms. Table 5, Panel C does not provide any further support 
to suggest that benchmark beaters manage their earnings more significantly than just miss firms 
or other firms based on a Basic EPS measure. 
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When evaluating benchmark beaters in the context of reporting a small positive Basic EPS 
result, mixed evidence suggests that benchmark beaters manage earnings more significantly 
than just miss firms and other firms. The DDMCNDISC measure in Table 5, Panel A found 
significantly higher discretionary accruals for benchmark beaters compared to other firms. 
While Table 5, Panel B found mixed evidence suggesting that benchmark beaters have higher 
discretionary accruals compared to just miss firms. Additional results in Table 5, Panel C 
compared just miss firms to other firms. The results in Table 5, Panel C did not suggest that 
benchmark beaters manage earnings more significantly than other firms or just miss firms. 
 
Overall, analysis of benchmark beaters based on Basic EPS provides some evidence that 
benchmark beaters are managing their earnings, with higher discretionary earnings reported for 
benchmark beaters compared to all other firms. However, this evidence is not completely 
consistent with discretionary earnings found to be similar between benchmark beaters and just 
miss firms. Given that benchmark beaters do not have higher discretionary accruals compared 
to just miss firms, further analysis is warranted to establish the extent of earnings management 
in the context of firms reporting small positive profits (Basic EPS). 
 
Interestingly, the benchmark beaters and just miss firms collectively had higher discretionary 
accruals compared to the other firms. This finding is mixed and does not support or reject the 
hypothesis that benchmark beaters manage their earnings to report a small EPS result. The 
finding is similar to that reported by Coulton et al. (2005), who identified benchmark beaters 
and just miss firms as having higher unexpected accruals compared to other firms.  
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Accrual Based Models – Positive Earnings Changes (EPS) 
Table 6 evaluates whether firms manage their earnings to beat prior year earnings using Basic 
EPS. To gauge whether firms are managing EPS to beat the previous year’s EPS result, firms 
are identified as benchmark beaters, just miss firms and other firms. Benchmark beaters are 
defined as firms reporting an EPS result greater than zero and less than or equal to one cent per 
share, above the previous year’s EPS result. Just miss firms are those firms reporting an EPS 
result less than zero and greater than or equal to one cent per share below the previous year’s 
EPS result. The other firms group includes any firm within the sample that is not included in the 
benchmark beaters or just miss group. 
 
Table 6: Positive Earnings Changes (Basic EPS) 
Panel A: Benchmark Beaters compared to all other firms (EPS – 1 cent change) 
                          
                                Benchmark Beaters                     Other Firms                  Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 137 0.10 0.10 844 0.09 0.09 -4.67 0.00 
DDMCNDISC 129 0.08 0.06 788 0.07 0.05 -0.49 0.63 
MCNDD 145 0.09 0.04 877 0.09 0.04 -0.04 0.97 
JONESDISC 129 0.00 0.02 805 -0.01 -0.01 -0.21 0.83 
MODJONESDISC 129 0.02 0.02 804 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.87 
 
Panel B: Benchmark Beaters compared to just miss firms (EPS – 1 cent change)                          
 
                                Benchmark Beaters                     Just Miss Firms            Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 137 0.10 0.10 117 0.10 0.10 -1.20 0.23 
DDMCNDISC 129 0.08 0.06 115 0.08 0.07 -0.64 0.53 
MCNDD 145 0.09 0.04 137 0.09 0.04 -0.23 0.82 
JONESDISC 129 0.00 0.02 128 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.98 
MODJONESDISC 129 0.02 0.02 128 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.94 
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Panel C: Just miss firms compared to other firms (EPS – 1 cent change) 
                          
                                Just Miss Firms                           Other firms                   Test for Differences 
 
 n Mean Median n Mean Median t-statistic p-value 
DDMCNINN 117 0.10 0.10 856 0.09 0.09 -4.86 0.00 
DDMCNDISC 115 0.08 0.07 794 0.07 0.05 -1.39 0.08 
MCNDD 137 0.09 0.04 874 0.09 0.04 -0.21 0.83 
JONESDISC 128 0.00 -0.01 795 -0.01 0.00 -0.19 0.85 
MODJONESDIS 128 0.01 -0.00 794 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.94 
 
Accrual measures for benchmark beating firms (small earnings changes EPS), compared to 
other firms (Panel A), compared to small loss firms (Panel B) 
Other firms include non-benchmark beating firms for each particular test 
0 cents per share < Benchmark beaters ≤ 1 cent per share 
-1 cent per share ≤ Small loss firms < 0 cents per share 
0 EPS excluded from sample (42 EPS excluded from sample) 
Two tailed tests of significance if the direction is predicted 
 
Where: 
DDMCNINN = Francis et al. version, of Dechow and Dichev model (2005) - Innate Accruals  
DDMCNDISC = Francis et al. version of Dechow and Dichev model (2005) - Discretionary 
Accruals 
MCNDD = McNichols version of Dechow and Dichev model (2002) – Accruals Quality 
JONESDISC = Jones model (1991) - Discretionary Accruals 
MODJONESDISC = Modified Jones model (1995) – Discretionary Accruals 
 
Table 6, Panel A compares benchmark beaters to other firms on the basis that firms reporting 
Basic EPS results just above the previous year’s EPS figure are more likely to manage their 
earnings in a discretionary manner. Discretionary earnings are not found be significantly higher 
for benchmark beaters compared to the other firms group. The benchmark beaters do show 
significantly higher discrepancies between their accruals and cash flows compared to the other 
firms group (t=-4.67, p=0.00). However, this is established through the DDMCNINN measure 
which measures the quality of accruals due to innate factors of the firm. These initial findings 
do not support the hypothesis that benchmark beaters have significantly higher discretionary 
accruals compared to other firms.   
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Benchmark beaters are compared to just miss firms in Table 6, Panel B with no significant 
results suggesting that benchmark beaters have higher discretionary accruals than just miss 
firms. Just miss firms are also compared to other firms within Table 6, Panel C to gauge further 
evidence of firms managing their earnings based on the previous year’s EPS result. Just miss 
firms demonstrate marginally significantly higher discretionary accruals than other firms using 
the DDMCNDISC measure (t=-1.39, p=0.08). While this result is significant, meaningful 
interpretation cannot be achieved due to the lack of significant results in the previous tests when 
comparing benchmark beaters to other firms and benchmark beaters to just miss firms (Table 6, 
Panels B and C). Panel C, Table 6 also shows significantly poorer innate accruals for other 
firms compared just miss firms (t=-6.63, p=0.00). 
 
Using accrual based models, benchmark beaters were compared to just miss firms and other 
firms in the context of beating the previous year’s EPS result to gauge whether benchmark 
beaters manage their earnings to achieve positive earnings changes. No significant evidence 
was found to suggest that firms manage their earnings to beat the previous year’s EPS result. 
These findings are based on the power of aggregate accrual models to capture discretionary 
earnings. The results provide little evidence to suggest that benchmark beating firms manage 
their earnings to surpass the previous year’s EPS result. 
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Additional Analysis – Earnings Persistence 
The analysis presented does not support the hypothesis that small positive earnings and positive 
earnings changes are signals of earnings management. It is possible that this is due to the 
inability of the accrual quality measures to identify earnings management. Tests of significance 
have been based on mean discretionary accruals for each group including benchmark beaters, 
other firms and just miss firms. Comparison of groups based on averages for discretionary 
accruals may be diluting the magnitude of earnings management conducted by benchmark 
beaters. Statistical probabilities are such that a percentage of firms fall naturally in to the 
benchmark beating group without actually being earnings managers. Alternatively, earnings 
management by Australian firms is non-existent or conducted on a very small scale.  
 
To further test whether benchmark beaters manage earnings the earnings persistence of 
benchmark beaters is examined. Prior research has established that discretionary accruals are 
less persistent than normal accruals, indicating that firms with larger discretionary accruals are 
likely to have lower earnings persistence (Xie, 2001). Other examples include the impact of 
restated earnings on the earnings persistence of firms, with lower earnings persistence reported 
for firms based on their non-restated earnings as opposed to their restated earnings (Hee, 2011). 
Coulton et al. (2005) tested the earnings persistence of unexpected accruals calculated by the 
Jones model to evaluate how well the Jones model identified unexpected accruals. Earnings 
persistence of the unexpected accruals was then evaluated against the normal accruals to gauge 
the accuracy of the Jones model. 
 
This additional analysis is being conducted to evaluate the validity of the finding that firms 
reporting a small positive Basic EPS result are more likely to manage their earnings. Earnings 
persistence is tested for each benchmark beating firm to identify if their earnings persistence is 
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significantly different from other firms during 2007. Other firms refer to any firm that is not a 
benchmark beater during 2007 and is listed on the ASX. If benchmark beaters report low 
earnings persistence during the test period this is an indication of earnings management, based 
on the implication that firms with higher discretionary earnings report lower earnings 
persistence (Xie, 2001).  
 
Earnings persistence is a function of the fundamental performance of a firm and the accounting 
system which measures the earnings performance (Dechow et al. 2010). The aim of this 
analysis is to evaluate earnings persistence changes due to the manipulation of discretionary 
accruals. Fundamental performance of each firm has not been controlled for in this study, and is 
a limitation of the earnings persistence measures conducted. Due to the impact of growth on 
earnings persistence this study only evaluates the 2006 – 2009 period of earnings persistence in 
an attempt to reduce the impact of growth on the firm-specific regressions (Fairfield, Whisenant 
and Yohn, 2003).  
 
To evaluate the earnings persistence of benchmark beaters and other firms this study 
implements an earnings persistence test first introduced by Freeman, Ohlson and Penman 
(1982). Two groups are established for comparative analysis to test the earnings persistence of 
Australian companies that report a small positive Basic EPS result in 2007. Firstly, a 
benchmark beating group is identified. This group includes 81 ASX listed firms reporting a 
Basic EPS greater than zero cents per share and less than or equal to one cent per share for 2007. 
Secondly, a group of firms is identified for 2007 that did not report a small positive Basic EPS 
result. 
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Although 2007 is the primary year of this study and the year where earnings management is 
predicted by benchmark beaters, earnings persistence is measured for the period 2006 to 2009 
to consider the persistence of earnings before and after the 2007 test year. Earnings persistence 
is measured after the test year of 2007 because earnings persistence is expected to increase after 
the year of earnings management. 
 
Earnings persistence is calculated based on the relation between current earnings and future 
earnings (Freeman et al. 1982). Earnings for the following year is the dependant variable and is 
regressed on earnings for the contemporary year to establish the level of earnings persistence. 
Earnings is proxied by earnings before interest and taxes (Clinch, Fuller, Govendir and Wells, 
2012). The earnings persistence model is displayed in Equation 10 below. 
Earningst+1 = α0 + α1Earningst + νt+1                                                                                                                         (11) 
 
Where: 
 
Earningst+1 is EBIT / average total assets for t+1 
Earningst is EBIT / average total assets for t 
 
Earnings persistence is calculated for the 2006/2007, 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 periods.  
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics – Benchmark Beaters and Other firms 
Panel A: Benchmark Beaters (n=81) 
 
Year                      Mean          Median          Std Dev          Minimum          Maximum 
 
EBIT2006                -0.12           -0.01              0.46                -3.02                 0.47 
EBIT2007                0.04            0.03                0.22                -1.30                 1.00 
EBIT2008                -.012           -0.03              0.29                -1.27                 0.38 
EBIT2009                -0.17           -0.07              0.43                -2.50                 0.68 
Panel B: Other Firms (n=1111) 
 
Year                      Mean          Median          Std Dev          Minimum          Maximum 
 
EBIT2006                -0.16           -0.04              0.49                -5.52                 1.58 
EBIT2007                -0.16           -0.04              0.47                -4.74                 1.51 
EBIT2008                -0.21           -0.07              0.60                -6.20                 1.52 
EBIT2009                -0.27           -0.07              1.02                -16.01               2.87 
 
Benchmark Beaters (< 0 cents per share - ≤ 1 cent per share) 
Other firms includes all ASX listed firms during 2007 excluding Benchmark Beaters 
Censored highest and lowest variable for each period 
EBIT is normalized for each year by total average assets 
Where EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes 
Total average assets = ((opening period total assets + closing period total assets)/2) 
 
Table 7, Panel A report’s the descriptive statistics for benchmark beaters from 2006 to 2009. 
The mean EBIT for 2006 is -0.12 with a median of -0.01. The mean EBIT and median EBIT for 
2007 benchmark beaters is 0.03 and 0.04 respectively. Mean EBIT and median EBIT reduce to 
-0.01 and -0.03 respectively for benchmark beaters in 2008. Finally, mean EBIT decreases in 
2009 to -0.17 and median EBIT falls to -0.07 for benchmark beaters.  
 
Table 7, Panel B shows the annual descriptive statistics for other firms from 2006 to 2009. The 
mean EBIT and median EBIT for 2006 for other firms is -0.16 and -0.04 respectively. In 2007, 
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mean EBIT and median EBIT are the same as 2006 with a mean of -0.16 and a median of -0.04. 
Other firms mean EBIT and median EBIT decrease in 2008 to -0.21 and -0.07 respectively. The 
mean EBIT of other firms decreases even further in 2009 to -0.27 and median EBIT stays 
constant at -0.07. Standard deviation is highest for other firms in 2009 at 1.02 with a minimum 
of -16.01 and a maximum of 2.87. The descriptive statistics of the other firms group 
demonstrate the impact of the global financial crisis with ASX listed firms reporting lower 
mean EBIT in 2008 and 2009. 
 
Table 8: Earnings Persistence Measures – Benchmark Beaters 
 
Year                    N               Beta               R Squared             p-value           
 
2006/2007          67               0.01                  -0.02                    0.91 
2007/2008          68               0.35                   0.07                    0.02 
2008/2009          67               0.88                   0.52                    0.00 
Small Positive EPS group for 2007 – Benchmark Beaters 
Australian firms reporting Basic EPS < 0 cents per share - ≤ 1 cent per share in 2007 
For each regression, censored highest and lowest dependent variable  
Results from ordinary least squares regression of future earnings on current earnings for 
benchmark beating group for the period from 2006 to 2009. 
 
Table 8 outlines the earning persistence results for benchmark beaters from 2006 to 2009. 
Analysis of the benchmark beaters demonstrates low earnings persistence from 2006 to 2007 
with a beta of 0.01 and a p-value of 0.91. A small coefficient implies low earnings persistence 
and a p-value of 0.91 indicates a limited relationship between earnings for 2006 and 2007. The 
adjusted R-square is -0.02 for 2007 earnings regressed on 2006 earnings, again suggesting that 
2006 earnings have little relation to 2007 earnings reported for benchmark beaters. These are 
interesting results given that earnings management is expected to occur in 2007 due to these 
benchmark beaters reporting a small positive Basic EPS result. 
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Alternatively, the earnings persistence for benchmark beaters increases considerably after the 
predicted year of earnings management in 2007 (table 8). The coefficient for 2008 earnings 
regressed on 2007 earnings is 0.35 (p=0.02). This indicates substantially higher earnings 
persistence compared to the previous year. Additionally, this demonstrates a clear relationship 
between earnings reported for 2007 and 2008 with p=0.02. The adjusted R-square of 0.07 is 
also higher for 2008 earnings regressed on 2007 earnings.  
 
The earnings persistence for benchmark beaters again indicates a strong relation for 2009 
earnings regressed on 2008 earnings. A beta of 0.88 indicates high earnings persistence and a p-
value of 0.00 confirms the significant relation between earnings for 2008 and 2009. The 
adjusted R-square of 0.52 shows earnings reported in 2008 explains more than half the variance 
in earnings in 2009. 
 
Table 9: Earnings Persistence Measures – Other Firms 
 
Year                    N               Beta               R Squared            p-value           
 
2006/2007          1111           0.58                0.414                    0.00 
2007/2008          1135           0.28                0.117                    0.00 
2008/2009          1145           0.77                0.228                    0.00 
Includes all ASX listed firms during 2007 excluding Benchmark Beaters in 2007 
For each regression, censored dependant variables that were unreasonable values 
1111 ASX listed Firms 
Results from ordinary least squares regression of future earnings on current earnings for other 
firms group for the period from 2006 to 2009. 
 
Table 9 outlines the earnings persistence results for other firms from 2006 to 2009. In 
comparison to benchmark beaters, the other firms group shows a clear relation between 2007 
earnings regressed on 2006 earnings. A coefficient of 0.58 indicates high earnings persistence 
for other firms and this relationship is significant at 0.00. An adjusted R-square of 0.41 
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indicates earnings for 2007 are an important explanatory variable for earnings reported in 2006. 
This is in contrast to the benchmark beating group which indicated almost no relation for 2007 
earnings regressed on 2006 earnings. 
 
Although other firm’s earnings persistence falls from 2007 to 2008, it continues to show a clear 
relation between earnings for the prior year and contemporary year. Earnings for 2008 
regressed on 2007 show a significant relationship with a p-value of 0.00 and a coefficient of 
0.28. Additionally, earnings for 2007 are an explanatory factor for 2008 earnings with an 
adjusted R-square of 0.12. Lastly, earnings persistence tests for other firms for 2008/2009 
indicate high earnings persistence with a beta of 0.77 and a p-value of 0.00. An adjusted R-
square of 0.23 confirms the explanatory component of 2008 earnings to predict the variance of 
2009 earnings for other firms.  
 
The earnings persistence regressions were also completed with a sub-sample of firms that were 
listed from 2006 to 2009. That is, regressions were completed with survivorship bias to confirm 
the initial earnings persistence results. The results reported in Table 8 and Table 9 were 
qualitatively the same when earnings persistence tests were limited to firms that were listed 
from 2006 to 2009.  
 
Overall, regressions of subsequent year earnings on current year earnings for other firms have 
indicated a significant relationship for each test period evaluated. Interestingly, the benchmark 
beaters indicated a strong relation between prior year earnings and current year earnings for 
each period tested excluding 2007 earnings regressed on 2006 earnings. This result is important 
given that the expected period of earnings management is 2007. These results highlight that 
earnings for benchmark beaters in 2006 are not indicative of earnings for benchmark beaters in 
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2007. Furthermore, when 2008 earnings are regressed on 2007 earnings for benchmark beaters 
there is an increase in the earnings persistence compared to the 2006/2007 period. This is in 
direct contrast to the other firms group which reports a decline in earnings persistence for 
2007/2008, compared to the 2006/2007 period.  
 
If losses are more timely, earnings persistence is expected to be low (Basu, 1997). However, the 
earnings persistence of benchmark beaters increases when the market is reporting a fall in mean 
EBIT for 2008, compared to 2007. Based on these earnings persistence tests, the lower earnings 
persistence reported by benchmark beaters in 2007 and lack of relation to prior year earnings 
tends to suggest evidence of earnings management by benchmark beaters. Additionally, the low 
earnings persistence reported for benchmark beaters during the 2006/2007 period is a unique 
occurrence for the period tested from 2006 to 2009. The benchmark beaters demonstrate 
increased earnings persistence for periods 2007/2008 and 2008/2009. 
 
Additional analysis was completed based on the entire sample of ASX listed firms for 2006 and 
2007. This additional test is completed to confirm the difference between earnings persistence 
for benchmark beaters and other firms. A dummy variable representing benchmark beaters for 
2007 is introduced in to the earnings regression to gauge whether benchmark beaters are 
significant when regressions are conducted for 2007 earnings on 2006 earnings. Similarly, 
earnings is proxied by EBIT for this additional test. 
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The earnings persistence model is displayed in equation 11. 
Earningst+1 = α0 + α1Earningst + BBt + νt+1                                                                                                            (12) 
Where: 
 
Earningst+1 is EBIT / average total assets for t+1 
Earningst is EBIT / average total assets for t 
BBt is benchmark beaters for t 
 
Table 10: Earnings Persistence – Benchmark Beaters and Other Firms 
 
Year                    N               Beta               t-statistic               p-value           
 
BBt                     81              -0.15                  -1.77                    0.08 
EBIT06              1183           0.74                   20.13                   0.00                            
Small Positive EPS group for 2007 – Benchmark Beaters 
Australian firms reporting Basic EPS < 0 cents per share - ≤ 1 cent per share in 2007 
Number of firms is 1183, denoted by all firms 
Benchmark beaters include 81 firms 
 
Table 10 shows that the dummy variable for benchmark beaters is marginally significant when 
regressions are conducted for 2007 earnings on 2006 earnings. This again provides some 
support to suggest that benchmark beating firms are reporting marginally different earnings 
persistence for the 2006 and 2007 period.  
 
Earnings persistence was tested for benchmark beaters against other firms to confirm the 
validity of the previous finding in this study, which identified evidence that firms reporting a 
small positive EPS result are more likely to manage their earnings. Earnings persistence was 
found to be significantly less for benchmark beaters compared to other firms in 2007. This 
finding is noteworthy given that 2007 is the predicted year of earnings management. The lack 
of relationship between earnings for 2006 and 2007 for benchmark beaters indicates further 
support for benchmark beaters managing their earnings to report a small positive Basic EPS. 
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Additionally, earnings for benchmark beaters in 2007 were the only period of earnings tested 
which did not have a significant relationship with the prior year’s earnings.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
This study conducted multiple approaches to identify earnings management within the 
Australian market. Companies with small positive earnings and positive earnings changes were 
assumed to be managing their earnings. Versions of the Dechow et al. (2002) accrual quality 
model, Jones earnings management model (1991, 1995) and earnings persistence measures 
were applied to identify whether companies with small positive earnings and positive earnings 
changes managed their earnings. 
 
Examination of the distribution of firms around the earnings benchmarks did not reveal a 
discontinuity at zero for small positive earnings and positive earnings changes with EPS and 
NPAT used as measures of earnings. This was confirmed by histograms suggesting 
approximately a normal distribution for small positive earnings and small positive earnings 
changes. Further tests were conducted to determine whether alternative specifications of 
benchmark beaters reveal earnings management. To this end, accrual based models were used 
to test whether benchmark beaters have higher discretionary accruals compared to all other 
firms and just miss firms. Examination of the positive earnings benchmark using NPAT did not 
indicate higher discretionary earnings for benchmark beaters compared to just miss firms or 
other firms. Additionally, discretionary earnings were not found to be significantly different for 
benchmark beaters based on small positive NPAT earnings changes from the prior year, when 
compared to just miss firms and other firms. This indicates that Australian listed firms do not 
manage their earnings based on NPAT, or versions of the Dechow et al. (2002) model lack the 
power to detect the earnings management.  
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Additional testing using Basic EPS as the earnings metric (as opposed to NPAT) was conducted 
to compare benchmark beaters, just miss firms and other firms. It was found that benchmark 
beaters reporting a small positive Basic EPS (< 0 cents per share - ≤ 1 cent per share) have 
significantly higher discretionary earnings compared to other firms applying the Francis et al. 
(2005) version of the Dechow et al. (2002) model. However, additional testing using Basic EPS 
indicated similar accruals quality for benchmark beaters and just miss firms. No evidence was 
identified to suggest that firms manage their earnings to report a small positive earnings change 
using Basic EPS or NPAT. 
 
Finally, additional testing was completed using earnings persistence to substantiate evidence 
and to reconcile the conflicting results reported by the accrual based models. Earnings 
persistence tests completed provided further support to suggest that benchmark beaters 
reporting a small positive Basic EPS result are earnings managers. Earnings persistence tests for 
benchmark beaters (small positive Basic EPS) identified low earnings persistence in the 
2006/2007 period, with a coefficient of 0.01. This low earnings persistence reported by 
benchmark beaters in the 2006/2007 period was important given that 2007 was the predicted 
year of earnings management. Furthermore, the earnings persistence of the benchmark beaters 
increased considerably in subsequent periods after the predicted year of earnings management. 
 
This study has provided a further assessment of the degree of earnings management around 
positive earnings and positive earnings change benchmarks. There still exists considerable 
scope within the earnings management literature to better identify and quantify earnings 
management around earnings benchmarks. Studies within Australia have yet to provide 
consistent evidence of the level of earnings management occurring around positive earnings and 
positive earnings change benchmarks. Explicit rewards for management will continue to 
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provide incentives for managers to achieve earnings benchmarks. Gains in earnings 
management research have the ability to reduce the impact of earnings management around 
benchmarks and ensure that companies are reporting a true representation of their financial 
position. 
 
This study has been limited to the Australian market and could be extended to other countries. 
Useful comparisons could be made with results from jurisdictions where the motivation and 
opportunity for benchmark beating is different. Additional evidence from other jurisdictions 
would be useful to corroborate the findings of this study. The limited time frame examined also 
reduces the generalizability of the results reported. Additional periods should be evaluated in 
future research to determine whether the results are time specific. Assessing a longer time 
period could provide evidence as to whether earnings management is declining, static or 
becoming more prevalent. Overall, this study indicates that a positive earnings benchmark 
(Basic EPS) is a better indicator of earnings management than positive earnings changes.  
Further research in to the positive earnings benchmark could yield more substantial evidence 
regarding whether Australian firms on average manipulate their earnings to report positive 
earnings.  
 
While this study evaluated the distributions of firms earnings based on a fiscal year, there are 
further research opportunities in the Australian market based on a distribution of earnings 
approach. Studies in the U.S have used interim reports as opposed to fiscal year reports in an 
attempt to characterise the distribution of earnings. Other research opportunities include 
evaluating the increased power of the Dechow et al. (2011) model in the Australian context to 
earnings management studies. This model has shown increased power to detect earnings 
management to alternative models and could assist auditors, regulators and researchers identify 
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companies managing their earnings. Australian researchers are in a unique position to use 
versions of the Dechow et al. (2002, 2011) models because prior, current and subsequent 
operating cash flows can be obtained directly from cash flow statements for Australian firms 
from 1992 to January, 2009.  
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